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ABSTRACT 
The nation’s one million firefighters are embedded in virtually every urban or 
rural area of the United States. Firefighters enter homes, businesses, vehicles, and other 
assets during emergency and non-emergency duties thousands of times each day in their 
efforts to prevent or respond to life and property loss. The unparalleled access that 
firefighters have to public and private locations puts them in a unique position to 
positively or negatively impact our nation’s homeland defense and security information-
sharing efforts. This thesis analyzes a number of information-sharing activities relating to 
terrorism and all-hazard strategies, policies, and programs in an attempt to identify 
whether U.S. fire personnel should participate in terrorism-related information sharing 
and—if they should participate—where the legal, political, and operational boundaries 
lie. The research identified a number of new strategic applications and tactical practices.  
The strategies and tactics are the result of comparing and contrasting legal compliance, 
political acceptability, target capabilities list linkage, operational impact, and cost factors 
of the current U.S. fire service information-sharing environment, the New York City Fire 
Department’s Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy, the U.S. Fire Service’s 
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We will build a national environment that enables the sharing of essential homeland 
security information. We must build a “system of systems” that can provide the right 
information to the right people at all times. Information will be shared “horizontally” 
across each level of government and “vertically” among federal, state, and local 
governments, private industry, and citizens. 
 
-The President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security1 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The nation’s one million firefighters are embedded in virtually every urban and 
rural area of the United States. Firefighters enter homes, businesses, vehicles, and other 
assets during emergency and non-emergency duties thousands of times each day in their 
efforts to prevent or respond to life and property loss. The unparalleled access that 
firefighters have to public and private locations puts them in a unique position to 
positively or negatively impact our nation’s homeland defense and security information-
sharing efforts. This thesis analyzes the current U.S. fire service information-sharing 
environment, the New York City Fire Department’s Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness 
Strategy, the U.S. Fire Service’s Intelligence Enterprise and the United Kingdom’s Civil 
Contingencies Act of 2004 in an attempt to determine whether U.S. fire personnel should 
participate in terrorism-related information sharing and—if they should participate—
where the legal, political, and operational boundaries lie. The research identified a 
number of new strategic applications and tactical practices. The strategies and tactics are 
the result of comparing and contrasting legal compliance, political acceptability, target 
capabilities list linkage, operational impact, and cost factors. The research produced three 
macro level findings, four information-sharing matrices, two strategic applications, and 
nine smart practices.   
The first universal or macro-level finding indicates that U.S. firefighters have 
legal, moral, and ethical responsibilities to gather and share potential terrorist-related 
information that could assist the homeland security community in preventing and 
disrupting terrorist attacks. Second, these responsibilities must be conducted within the 
context of a two hundred fifty–year U.S. fire service enterprise founded on saving lives 
and property while maintaining exemplary trustworthiness, reliability, and credibility 
with the public. The third inclusive finding is that legal and operational issues may be 
addressed by firefighters using standardized terrorist indicators while operating as sensors 
of opportunity during emergency and non-emergency operations, but that fire personnel 






The first strategic recommendation of this thesis is to modify the National 
Strategy for Information Sharing (NSIS) to include the fire service as an information-
sharing partner in some situations. The second strategic recommendation presents a 
strategic information-sharing plan to enhance the current homeland security community 
and fire service ad hoc information-sharing environment.  
The nine suggested smart practices are located in the chapter on analysis and 
recommendations and range from four common terrorist indicators that every firefighter 
should know to national U.S. guidance templates for formally requesting classified or 
sensitive information. 
Possibly more important than all the findings, recommendations, plans, and smart 
practices identified in this thesis is the recognition of who firefighters are and what they 
can do to prevent or disrupt terrorism through information sharing. Since before the time 
of Fire Chief Benjamin Franklin, the fire service has been built on the legal, moral, and 
ethical commitment to protect U.S. citizens through prevention and response. The 
continued sporadic, unstructured information sharing of potential terrorist-related 
information is unacceptable. We are at war, and war calls for risks if we want to prevail. 
One of the risks of using fire personnel to collect information in plain sight is the 
tarnishing of our reputation or possible legal action. I propose that the risk is considerably 
less than dealing with the consequences of the attacks on the Murrah Building or the 
World Trade Center, or more horrendous acts of terrorism. We must continue to build on 
the U.S. fire service’s long and successful history of prevention.  
More than seven years ago the terrorist attacks of 9/11 became the catalyst for the 
U.S. expansion of information gathering and sharing with non-traditional partners such as 
the fire service. Now is the time for action. The significant value of fire personnel’s 
prevention of life and property loss from terrorism through the use of standardized 
terrorist indicators and formalized collaboration with the homeland security community 
should not be underestimated. The one million U.S. fire personnel serving in over thirty 
thousand fire departments may be a phenomenal resource for our homeland security 
partners, and our homeland security partners could be a valuable resource for firefighters.  
xvii 
If the strategic and operational recommendations identified in this thesis are implemented 
by the nation’s fire personnel, the volume of suspicious-activity reporting should increase 
and with it the potential for the prevention or disruption of future terrorism in the United 
States. Citizens will be safer and, in my opinion, will appreciate their firefighters stepping 
up as they have historically done to prevent life and property loss in our country. The 
terrorist beat us on at least two days, April 19, 1995, and September 11, 2001. We should 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The role of the fire service in preventing terrorism through information sharing 
with local, state, and federal homeland security partners is not clear.2 The 9/11 
Commission Report described the failure of the intelligence community to “connect the 
dots” that may have prevented the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.3 The purpose 
of this thesis is to identify the level of firefighter involvement in the collection, 
dissemination, and consumption of potential terrorist information in order to “connect the 
dots” before the next major attack in the United States. The current information-sharing 
environment, one local U.S. strategy, a U.S. national concept, and the United Kingdom’s 
Civil Contingencies Act are analyzed and qualitatively compared to each other and the 
current fire service–homeland security information-sharing environment. The 
recommendations range from local tactical through national strategic actions for the U.S. 
fire service.  
Over six years have passed since the release of the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, yet little progress has been made toward solving the Gordian knot of 
information sharing between the U.S. fire service’s more than 1 million fire personnel 
and the homeland security community.4 Unfortunately, we cannot simply cleave the knot 




2 In the fall of 2007, I met with Oklahoma City Fire Chief Keith Bryant to discuss potential thesis 
topics that would benefit the Oklahoma City Fire Department and the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). In a broader context we also considered contemporary fire service and homeland security issues. 
Chief Bryant had recently returned from a Metropolitan Fire Chiefs Association conference in which 
homeland security issues had been considered. We discussed the current homeland security prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery missions as they relate to traditional fire service prevention and response 
missions. Chief Bryant indicated that he and other fire chiefs of metropolitan-size fire departments were 
inquiring about their departments’ role in an emerging all-hazards homeland security culture. 
3 National Commission, 9/11 Commission Report, 426.  
4 U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Information Sharing, 10. “For the purposes of 
the ISE IP, the term “homeland security community” includes the Department of Homeland Security and 
those agencies with public health and welfare, emergency response, transportation, fire, and emergency 
management.” It should be noted that the only reference to “fire” or “homeland security community” in the 





                                                
 the most fundamental tactical skill, in order to develop horizontal and vertically oriented 
policies, strategies, and tactics to identify and share potential terrorist-related information 
and intelligence.5 
A. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
There has been, and continues to be, considerable ambiguity among the homeland 
security community regarding what is homeland security.6 Christopher Bellavita, in his 
article “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?” indicated, “There 
are at least seven different definitions of homeland security.”7 For the purposes of this 
thesis, the terms “homeland security community” or “homeland security partners” are 
defined based on the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Information Sharing 






5 White House, National Strategy For Homeland Security, 56. The national vision for Homeland 
Security is that “we will build a national environment that enables the sharing of essential homeland 
security information. We must build a ‘system of systems’ that can provide the right information to the 
right people at all times. Information will be shared ‘horizontally’ across each level of government and 
‘vertically’ among federal, state, and local governments, private industry, and citizens. With the proper use 
of people, processes, and technology, homeland security officials throughout the United States can have 
complete and common awareness of threats and vulnerabilities as well as knowledge of the personnel and 
resources available to address these threats. Officials will receive the information they need so they can 
anticipate threats and respond rapidly and effectively. The incorporation of data from all sources across the 
spectrum of homeland security will assist in border management, critical infrastructure protection, law 
enforcement, incident management, medical care, and intelligence. In every instance, sensitive and 
classified information will be scrupulously protected. We will leverage America’s leading-edge 
information technology to develop an information architecture that will effectively secure the homeland.” 
6 Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security,” Regarding the definition of homeland security, Dr. 
Bellavita indicates that “the argument has been made that a single definition would be desirable and 
beneficial for a number of reasons, mostly having to do with efficiency and effectiveness criteria. But there 
is no one authority that can command everyone to use language the same way. Other important and often 
used terms—like terrorism, justice, disaster, or emergency management—also do not have single 
definitions. Yet we make progress in understanding and using each of those ideas. The absence of 
agreement can be seen as grist for the continued evolution of homeland security as a practice and as an 
idea. Even if people did agree to define homeland security with a single voice, there would still be the 
matter of behavior. What people, organizations, and jurisdictions do is as instructive as what they say.” 
7 Ibid. 
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includes the Department of Homeland Security and those agencies with public health and 
welfare, emergency response, transportation, fire, and emergency management 
responsibilities.”8  
The term “information sharing,” within the framework of this thesis, is based on 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which defines homeland security information as 
“any information possessed by a federal, state, or local agency that (a) related to the 
threat of terrorist activity, (b) relates to the ability to prevent, interdict or disrupt terrorist 
activity, (c) would improve the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or 
terrorist organization; or (d) would improve the response to a terrorist act.”9 The terms 
“fire personnel, firefighter or fire service” include the functions of “firefighting, 
emergency medical services, technical rescue, hazardous materials operations, aviation 
operations, marine operations, fire prevention activities, fire inspections, fire 
investigations and fire communications.”10  
The term “information sharing or intelligence” is defined as  
All-hazard information that has been gathered and vetted through the 
intelligence cycle in order to generate products that can be used to guide 
Fire Service decisions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Also 
information provided by the Fire Service to the intelligence community to 
support the production of finished intelligence products.11 
 
8 U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Information Sharing, 10. “For the purposes of 
the ISE IP, the term “homeland security community” includes the Department of Homeland Security and 
those agencies with public health and welfare, emergency response, transportation, fire, and emergency 
management.” It should be noted that the only reference to “fire” or “homeland security community” in the 
123-page document is a footnote on page 10. 
9 Masse, “Homeland Security Intelligence,” See P.L. 107-296, Sec. 892(f). The House Committee on 
Homeland Security clarified homeland security information within a terrorism framework. Under Rule IV, 
Subcommittees, it defines the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and 
Terrorism Risk Assessment as being, in part, “intelligence and information sharing for the purpose of 
preventing, preparing for, and responding to potential terrorist attacks on the United States; the 
responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security for comprehensive, nationwide, terrorism-related 
threat, vulnerability, and risk analyses; the integration, analysis, and dissemination of homeland security 
information, including the Department of Homeland Security’s participation in, and interaction with, other 
public and private entities for any of those purposes.” Masse goes on to provide the following reference: 
“Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Rules and Appendix for the Committee 
on Homeland Security, Committee Print 109-B, Oct. 2005.” 
10 U.S. Homeland Security Act 2002. 
11 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 





                                                
For the purposes of this thesis, the term "all-hazards" refers to “domestic terrorist 
attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies.”12  
B. WHY FIREFIGHTERS? 
Fire service information sharing and collaboration may be at the beginning stage 
of future homeland security partnerships, if one considers that the United States has over 
one million firefighters serving in over thirty thousand fire departments that respond to 
over twenty-four million emergencies annually.13 Firefighters enter homes, businesses, 
vehicles, and other assets during emergency and non-emergency duties thousands of 
times each day in their efforts to prevent and respond to life and property loss. This 
access allows them to identify potential terrorist activities, oftentimes unexpectedly for 
both the firefighters and the potential terrorists. The unparalleled interface that 
firefighters have with public and private locations puts them in a unique position to 
positively or negatively impact our homeland security information-sharing efforts.  
Information sharing between the fire service and the homeland security 
community is important for at least two reasons. The first reason relates to legal issues. 
The unprecedented access that firefighters gain onto or into private property places them 
in a unique position to gather potential terrorist-related information for the prevention or 
disruption of terrorist attacks before they occur, but firefighters must be cognizant of 
activities and actions that may result in civil rights violations of the people they have 
been given the honor to serve. The second reason relates to policy and operational 
information-sharing issues. Since 9/11 more citizens, government, private sector, and 
other non-traditional intelligence community actors are being encouraged to report 
suspicious behaviors or circumstances. Despite the obvious potential benefit of sharing 
information, a number of policy and operational challenges must be addressed. For 
example there are issues relating to firefighters as consumers of intelligence and 
 
12 U.S. Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-8. 
13 National Fire Protection Association, The United States Fire Service, 1; U.S. Fire Administration, 
Fire Departments, 1. 
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information in preparation for and in response to potential terrorist incidents at specific 
locations or special events. What policies and procedures are necessary for non-
traditional information sources such as firefighters as producers and consumers of open 
source and, in some cases, classified information? Also, few firefighters have received 
formal training in what terrorist indicators to look for and how to communicate the 
information efficiently.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What homeland security strategies, policies, and programs may be used to assist 
fire departments and the homeland security community in the identification and sharing 
of information about potential terrorist activities?14 The findings of this thesis indicate 
that firefighters may have legal, moral, and ethical responsibilities to gather and share 
potential terrorist-related information that could assist the homeland security community 
in preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks. These responsibilities must be conducted 
within the context of a 250-year U.S. fire service enterprise of working together to save 
lives and property while maintaining exemplary credibility with the public. Legal 
applicability of reporting observations collecting and sharing information must be 
adhered to, not only to reduce legal exposure, but also to lessen or prevent tarnishing the 
fire service reputation of trustworthiness and reliability. Legal and operational issues may 
be addressed by firefighters using uniform terrorist indicators that do not detract from 
their primary mission or violate the customer’s legal rights.  
This thesis identifies a number of smart practices from local, national, and 
international fire service strategies and governmental actions. Using qualitative criteria, 
thought was given to local, national, and international smart practices, gaps, and potential 
blind spots applicable to the U.S. fire service information-sharing environment using the 
 
14 U.S. Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security Goal to Prevent and 
Disrupt Terrorist Attacks, 15. “While our information sharing capabilities have improved significantly, 
substantial obstacles remain. We must continue to break down information barriers among Federal, State, 
local, and Tribal partners and the private sector.” One barrier is the lack of consistent, basic, potential 
terrorism-related information collection, sharing, and feedback guidelines for the fire service. The lack of 
guidelines may create an environment where critical information to prevent or disrupt terrorist activities is 






                                                
following criteria. Consideration was given to the legal, political, governance, 
effectiveness and costs aspects for the four information-sharing options.  
The nation’s more than one million firefighters are embedded in virtually every 
community in the United States, and they routinely operate in public and on private 
property, in emergency and non-emergency environments with little or no warning. 
Oftentimes firefighters live and work in the same neighborhoods, districts, or 
communities for twenty years or more. Their responsibility to enter a property at any time 
for the good and welfare of the people places them in a position to witness “the thousands 
and thousands of routine, everyday observations and activities” of which Secretary 
Chertoff spoke.15  
1. Overview of Legal, Moral and Ethical Considerations 
The legal, moral, and ethical limits associated with firefighters’ gathering and 
sharing potential terrorism information has produced various opinions about what, if any, 
terrorist information collection firefighters should be involved with. For example, since 
the fall of 2007, there have been several media stories as well as discussions among the 
National Postgraduate School Master’s of Homeland Security 0705/0706 Cohorts 
regarding fire department participation in terrorism prevention activities, particularly the 
fire service role in information collection, dissemination, and participation in fusion 
centers. The media reports and cohort discussions have resulted in a wide range of 
opinions about what fire departments are doing or should be doing to prevent terrorism. 
Keith Olberman’s interview with Mike German on MSNBC’s Countdown, is one 
example. Mike German, a former FBI agent who was the national security policy counsel 
to the ACLU, indicated that the traditional role of firefighters is for life safety and 
property conservation—not intelligence collection for the homeland security 
community.16  
 
15 Chertoff, Remarks at the 2006 Bureau of Justice Assistance, March 14, 2006.  
16 Olberman, Interview with Mike German. Mike German is a former FBI agent who is now national 
security policy counsel to the ACLU. See also National Terror Alert Response Center, “Firefighters to Help 
In Fight Against Terrorism.” 
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Several court cases have indicated that warrants or consents are not required for 
entry by firefighters as long as there are emergency or exigent circumstances present, and 
any evidence acquired during fire origin-and-cause determination should be reported.17  
Fire personnel access appears to place firefighters in a position to identify terrorist 
activities or information in plain sight. Further discussion of the legal, moral, and ethical 
issues relating to the authority of firefighter participation in information sharing during 
emergency and non-emergency activities is discussed in later chapters. 
2. Future Research Efforts and Near Term Customers 
For many years it has been a common practice in U.S. fire departments to 
informally share information relating to potential illegal activities with the law 
enforcement community. This collaboration has occurred during emergency and non-
emergency operations. A fire service-wide policy for terrorism information collection and 
sharing may be a logical extension of historical law enforcement and fire department 
information-sharing relationships. This thesis may assist future efforts in the area of 
information collection and sharing among non-traditional homeland security partners.  
Regarding benefactors of this thesis, the immediate and primary consumers are 
the U.S. fire service and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), based on a 
mission of preventing and mitigating life and property loss through information sharing.  
D. RESEARCH METHOD 
The qualitative methodology utilized in this thesis project was intended to identify 
and illuminate benefits and detriments by eliminating options that are clearly weaker in 
terms of legality, political acceptability, target capabilities list linkage, operational 
impact, and costs. The results of this thesis reflect recommendations to assist U.S. fire 
departments and their information-sharing partners in the identification, dissemination, 
and consumption of potential terrorist-related information. Recommendations are based 
on the gaps between the current U.S. fire service–homeland security information-sharing 
environment and the smart practices from local, national, and international sources.  
 





The national effort to enhance homeland security through information sharing 
with the fire service may result in considerable benefits and involve relatively small 
financial and other costs. The most significant benefits of information sharing are 
reduction in the risk of terrorist attacks and enhanced preparedness of firefighters. Other 
benefits include reduction in the effects of unintentional manmade disasters such as 
hazardous materials releases, as well as improved natural disaster mitigation, response, 
and recovery operations.  
E. INFORMATION-SHARING FACTORS 
The factors used to compare and contrast the four information-sharing options 
(current fire service, FDNY Strategy, FSIE and CCA) are described below. Each of the 
four information-sharing options examined for this thesis is analyzed based on five 
factors and graphically represented by an information-sharing matrix. The five factors 
measured are legal compliance, political acceptability, target capabilities linkage, 
operational impact, and cost.  
1. Legal Compliance  
The four information-sharing options were considered for compliance with legal 
rulings as they relate to entry onto or into property by firefighters during emergency and 
non-emergency operations. The cases regarded as applicable for fire personnel collecting 
potential terrorist information were: Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Michigan v. 
Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984); and Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of 
San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), as well as the Homeland Security Act 2002, 
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Subtitle I—Information Sharing.18 The definitions of Homeland Security Intelligence and 
Information may help clarify legal compliance. In an attempt to define homeland security 
intelligence, Todd Masse in his Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress 
“Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches” 
stated: 
Homeland security intelligence could likely be defined as a more refined 
and finished version of homeland security information. The nexus to 
terrorism and terrorist-related events is direct and compelling. One 
complication of discerning what is homeland security information remains 
how the investigator or operator knows that the activity which they are 
investigating or monitoring is related to terrorism…. Given that there are 
substantial national and homeland security penalties for not sharing 
homeland security intelligence, at least at the policy level and to some 
extent at the operational level, arguably there is now a bias in favor of 
sharing raw intelligence across levels of government more quickly than in 
the past. The extent to which this information is shared systematically is 
an open question.19 
Masse went on to say that: 
The primary statutory definition that applies is that which appears in the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, which defines homeland security 
information as any information possessed by a federal, state, or local 
agency that (a) related to the threat of terrorist activity, (b) relates to the 
ability to prevent, interdict or disrupt terrorist activity, (c) would improve 
the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist 
organization; or (d) would improve the response to a terrorist act.20 
 
18 “The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through the 
Fourteenth, through its prohibition of ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials,” Camara, 387 U.S. at 528. 
“(1) Under procedures prescribed by the President, all appropriate agencies, including the intelligence 
community, shall, through information sharing systems, share homeland security information with Federal 
agencies and appropriate State and local personnel to the extent such information may be shared, as 
determined in accordance with subsection (a), together with assessments of the credibility of such 
information. (2) Each information sharing system through which information is shared under paragraph (1) 
shall— (A) have the capability to transmit unclassified or classified information, though the procedures and 
recipients for each capability may differ; (B) have the capability to restrict delivery of information to 
specified subgroups by geographic location, type of organization, position of a recipient within an 
organization, or a recipient’s need to know such information; (C) be configured to allow the efficient and 
effective sharing of information; and (D) be accessible to appropriate State and local personnel.” U.S. 
Homeland Security Act 2002. 
19 Masse, “Homeland Security Intelligence,” 12.  





                                                
Masse attempts to clear up the ambiguity with the following: “Although the DHS 
remains an organization designed to protect against ‘all Hazards,’ the focus of homeland 
security information, at least as defined in law, is counterterrorism.”21  
Masse’s comments may reinforce the idea of enhancing fire service information 
sharing with the DHS through a systematic approach based on the philosophy that 
involves firefighters as sensors of opportunity, within the scope of their normal or 
primary duties. 
Firefighters may have a legal right and responsibility to collect and share potential 
terrorist-related information if the information is in plain sight during the course of their 
duties. Firefighters may enter homes, businesses, vehicles, and other assets without 
warrants to prevent and respond to potential life and property loss. They should legally 
identify potential terrorist activities or information in plain sight while performing their 
assigned emergency and non-emergency duties. The court rulings do not allow for 
“arbitrary invasions” or “unreasonable searches and seizures” by fire personnel. 
2. Political Acceptability  
For this thesis, “political acceptability” refers to policy-level support. The 
decision makers generally considered were formal policy groups accountable for the 
strategy, concept of operations or act. Examples could be local, state, or national 
governing bodies accountable for the strategy or act. In some circumstances consideration 
was given to labor representatives, such as the International Association of Firefighters or 
the ACLU, that might have significant influence and interest in the political acceptability 
of the strategy, act, or current information-sharing environment.  
3. Target Capabilities Linkage  
In 2004, DHS released fifteen National Planning Scenarios.22 The National 
Planning Scenarios listed and explained the hazards and risks associated with high-
 
21 Masse, “Homeland Security Intelligence,” 13. 
22 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios. 
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impact events that would significantly affect local emergency-response capabilities. The 
capabilities identified in the planning scenarios resulted in thirty-six target capabilities 
within four mission areas (prevention, protection, response, and recovery). The criteria 
for this thesis relied on four of the nine “prevention target capabilities” listed in the DHS 
National Preparedness Guidelines.23 The four target capabilities were selected due to 
their correlation to information sharing.24 The four target capabilities were:  
 Intelligence/information-sharing and dissemination;  
 CBRNE detection; 
 Information gathering and recognition of indicators;  
 Warnings, intelligence analysis, and production.  
4. Operational Impact  
How the current fire service information-sharing environment, Strategy or CCA 
would influence the operation of the homeland security information-sharing community 
was measured initially by collecting key indicators of success, such as those identified in 
the documents themselves and in some cases post-product analysis. 
5. Costs  
The United States spends approximately $100 billion per year on homeland 
security.25 Homeland security expenses include federal, state, and local law enforcement, 
and emergency medical, public works, and fire services, but excluded most funding for 
the armed forces.26 Generally speaking, the national effort to enhance homeland security 
through information sharing with the fire service appears to involve some relatively small 
fiscal costs. Costs include the human resources the fire service and homeland security 
communities have committed specifically to information sharing. Most costs appeared to 
 
23 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidelines, 4. 
24 Ibid.  
25 White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, xxii. 





                                                
be “soft costs” absorbed by current fire and intelligence personnel responsible for the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information.  
 F. CONCLUSION 
While intelligence gathering, collaboration, and dissemination is not new, the 
awareness of how fire service information sharing might enhance national, state, and 
local security has become an issue since late 2001. The current fire service information-
sharing analysis conducted for Chapter III  is based predominately on post-9/11 data and 
attempts to incorporate academic, speculative, and experiential sources. It should be 
noted that the information on fire service–homeland security participation and potential 
conceptual models is limited but appears to be growing, especially within the Department 
of Homeland Security, fusion centers, and larger metropolitan fire departments.  
Chapter IV identifies the Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness FDNY Strategy 
(FDNY Strategy) information-sharing smart practices to improve safety and effectiveness 
in a post-9/11, multifaceted, all-hazards threat environment. According to the 9/11 
Commission, the lack of information sharing on 9/11 may have resulted in unwarranted 
fatalities for civilians, firefighters, and other responders in New York City. “Information 
that was critical to informed decision making was not shared among agencies. FDNY 
Chiefs in leadership roles that morning have told us their decision making capability was 
hampered by lack of information from NYPD aviation.”27 
At the international level, a review of Canada, Australia, Israel, and the United 
Kingdom’s terrorism information-sharing environment related to the fire service and their 
homeland security partners resulted in the identification of one applicable information-
sharing legislative action, the United Kingdom’s Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 (CCA). 
The CCA is the product of a legislative evolution that began with the United Kingdom’s 
Emergency Powers Act of 1920, continued with the 1948 Civil Protection Act, and the 
fuel crisis, the foot-and-mouth outbreak, and World Trade Center attacks that occurred in 
 
27 National Commission, 9/11 Commission Report, 321.  
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2001. Chapter V of this thesis provides the results of a qualitative comparison of the CCA 
in relationship to the current U.S. fire service information-sharing environment.  
In constructing the recommendations in Chapter VI, a local-to-international 
approach was used to compare and contrast information sharing between the fire service 
and other alliances. The fundamental qualitative premise was that there were—and are—
lessons to be learned by the U.S. fire service from the current international, national, and 
local information-sharing partnerships. Chapter VI analyzes and consolidates the value of 
contemporary smart practices identified in Chapters III through V. 
The final chapter of this thesis offers a road map for increased information 
sharing by combining traditional strategic planning approaches such as those found in 
Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations with emerging strategic 
planning systems such as The Blue Ocean Strategy and The Starfish and the Spider.28 
 
28 Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations; Kim and Mauborgne, Blue 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature relating to the role of the fire service in prevention is almost 
exclusively recent and emerging. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 appear to be the catalyst for 
expansion of the idea of information-sharing policies with non-traditional partners such 
as fire departments. In most countries, including the United States, the value of the fire 
service in preventing life and property loss from terrorism through informal and formal 
collaboration with the homeland security community is yet to be determined at the 
national, state, and most local levels. Some of the information-sharing literature reviewed 
identifies value for the firefighters participating in information-sharing, while other 
literature was silent on the issue. In those documents supporting a fire service role in 
information sharing, firefighters were seen as significant force-multipliers in the effort to 
prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks.  
In the United States there has been a growing number of policies, programs, and 
media stories regarding fire department participation in terrorism prevention activities, 
particularly the fire service role as collectors, disseminators, and consumers of potential 
terrorist-related information, as well as firefighter participation in fusion centers.29 The 
media reports and policies have resulted in a wide range of opinions about what, if any, 
information-sharing activities fire departments are doing or should be doing to prevent 
terrorism. Awareness of how the U.S. fire service may or may not enhance terrorism 
prevention is not apparent.  
This literature review was organized around the idea of the U.S. fire service’s 
sharing information for the prevention of terrorism. Consideration was given to the type 
of organizations (local, state, national, and international) that might assist in defining 
what role the fire service has in the homeland security information-sharing community. 
The information on fire department homeland security participation and potential 
conceptual models is limited but appears to be growing, especially within DHS and larger 
metropolitan fire departments.  
 
29 Olberman. Interview with Mike German. See also National Terror Alert Response Center, 
“Firefighters to Help In Fight Against Terrorism,” and Miller, Andrew Miller Center for Homeland 






                                                
In late 2002 President Bush commissioned the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission). The 9/11 
Commission’s Final Report included recommendations designed to guard against future 
attacks. One recommendation involved unity of effort. The following excerpt may have 
application to the role of the fire service in sharing information with the intelligence 
community:  
National intelligence is still organized around the collection disciplines of 
the home agencies, not the joint mission. The importance of integrated, all 
source analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to 
“connect the dots.” No one component holds all the relevant 
information.30 
On December 17, 2003, President George W. Bush released Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 8 "National Preparedness" (HSPD-8).31 The intent of HSPD-8 
was
Establish policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to 
prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, 
major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic 
all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved 
delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and Local 
governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities 
of Federal, State, and Local entities (emphasis added). 32 
In the fire service, successful prevention has eliminated or mitigated many 
emergency responses. As the Oklahoma City Fire Marshal responsible for fire prevention 
services, it is my view that when a fire vehicle leaves the station responding to an 
emergency call, it is due to a gap in our prevention efforts. Successful fire and life loss-
prevention missions require a unity of effort from a diversified cadre of citizens, federal, 
state, local, private, and public partners working together and sharing information to 
reduce life and property loss. The losses can be reduced through engineering controls and 
 
30 National Commission, 9/11 Commission Report, 426.  
31 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Preparedness Goal, 3.  
32 U.S. Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-8, 1. 
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behavioral changes founded on an expectation of personal responsibility and sharing of 
information between all parties over an extended period of time. In the case of fire 
prevention in the United States, the time period has been hundreds of years. 
Unfortunately, in the current terrorism environment we do not have the luxury of decades 
or centuries to build the coalitions necessary to create the preferred future, so we must 
leverage all our assets to lessen or eliminate the terrorist threat now.  
In October 2007, almost four years after HSPD-8, the National Strategy for 
Information Sharing (NSIS) was released. The NSIS helped to clarify the trend in the 
United States to collaborate with non-traditional human-intelligence partners.  
The Intelligence Community will continue to be a primary source for this 
information; however, the Intelligence Community must modify its 
processes and procedures to encompass non-traditional customers at all 
levels of government with roles in prevention and response. In addition, 
important information regarding possible attack planning may come from 
organizations outside the Intelligence Community. Our challenge is to 
ensure that information from all sources is brought to bear on our efforts 
to protect our people and infrastructure from terrorist attacks.33 
The same month that the NSIS was released, the Homeland Security Council’s 
National Strategy for Homeland Security was distributed.34 The National Security 
Council’s Strategy also supported the idea of collaboration with non-traditional partners 
as exemplified in the following statement: 
State, Local, and Tribal governments, which best understand their com-
munities and the unique requirements of their citizens, provide our first 
response to incidents through law enforcement, fire, public health, and 
emergency medical services. They will always play a prominent, frontline 
role in helping to prevent terrorist attacks as well as in preparing for and 




33 National Security Council, National Strategy for Information Sharing, 10. 
34 U.S. Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 4. 





                                                
Firefighters and fire stations are located in virtually every community in the 
United States. Most fire departments are staffed by volunteers, and I suggest that those 
volunteers as well as most paid fire personnel understand their communities and the 
unique requirements of their citizens. 
The homeland security community and “first responders” appear to have accepted 
the traditional role of fire departments in response to terrorist attacks.36 What is not as 
clear is the fire service role, in the prevention of terrorist attacks in accordance with 
various presidential directives and national strategies.  
Major fires throughout history have destroyed whole cities and caused massive 
loss of life and property. Solutions were devised that have gradually, over several 
hundred years, reduced the danger to a level that allows us to co-exist with the threat of 
fire by applying constant vigilance and investments in fire protection, but without living 
in constant fear and dread from fire. In their paper “The War on Terrorism and What We 
Can Learn from the War on Fire,” John Whitely and Gerold Yonas state “Prevention is 
the holy grail of our terrorism protection plan just as prevention is the key to our fire 
protection plan…we have created a multi-pronged approach to fire protection that 
involves both government and individuals in the prevention, mitigation, and response to 
fires.”37 An example of terrorism protection that involved both government and people is 
the “See Something, Say Something” campaign. In March of 2003, the New York City 
Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) developed and implemented a program called “If 
You See Something, Say Something” to encourage transit passengers to report suspicious 
 
36 Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Preparedness Goal; U.S. Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive HSPD-8. “The term ‘first responder’ refers to those individuals who in the early 
stages of an incident are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the 
environment, including emergency response providers as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well as emergency management, public health, clinical continued, care, public 
works, and other skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide immediate support 
services during prevention, response, and recovery operations.”  
37 Whitely and Yonas, The War on Terrorism, 3-9.  
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activities and help in the prevention or disruption of terrorist activities. The program 
yielded 1,944 tips in 2006 and has been adopted by transit systems worldwide.38  
An example of a fire department that is active in terrorism prevention is the New 
York City Fire Department (FDNY). According to FDNY Fire Commissioner Nicholas 
Scoppetta, the FDNY is working cooperatively with the homeland security community. 
The FDNY Bureau of Fire Investigation is linked to the New York State Office of Public 
Security Counter Terrorism Network System and participates with the Joint Terrorist 
Task Force and the Metropolitan Committee on Counter Terrorism. The FDNY revised 
the way they process missing or stolen property so that the NYPD Intelligence Bureau 
and the FBI are now notified immediately. Other cooperative efforts include participation 
in the compilation of the City’s Vulnerable Location Database and reporting of 
potentially suspicious toxic substances. Commissioner Scoppetta indicated, “There is 
more we can do and will do. Although our responders are not law enforcement personnel, 
they can, by the nature of their work, gather valuable information.”39  
Information sharing among disciplines within the New York City Emergency 
Services Sector also appears to be growing, as exemplified by the following October 9, 
                                                 
38 New York State Metropolitan Transit Authority, “If You See Something, Say Something.” The 
program is based on a multi-media public education campaign that encourages users of the MTA’s 
transportation network to call an NYPD hotline or tell an MTA employee if they see anything suspicious. 
According to Elliot G. Sander, MTA Executive Director and CEO, “The ‘See Something, Say Something
campaign is a phenomenally successful component of the MTA’s comprehensive security strategy.…We
are proud that our customers play such an active role in keep
’ 
 
ing the system safe, and I am not surprised that 




ampaign has been copied around the world, from Chicago to
ains the MTA’s top priority.” MTA Director of Security William A. Morange indicated, “It is 
ossible for the police departments to be everywhere and see everything. Our passengers extend our 
reach and—by sharing their information—make the system safer.” The program reminds passengers to 
contact authorities if any of the following are noticed: “Be alert to unattended packages. Be wary of 
suspicious behavior. Take notice of people in bulky or inappropriate clothing. Report exposed wiring or 
other irregularities. Report anyone tampering with surveillance cameras or entering unauthorized area
Learn the basics of safe train evacuation at www.mta.info.” 








atchline excerpt that was shared between the fire, police, and other 
ents.40  
Routine Call Uncovers Possible Terrorist “Nest” – Police officers were 
investigating a suspected identity thief, but instead uncovered terrorist-
related materials that include copied identifications, al-Qaeda news 
clippings, literature on purchasing and processing chemicals, laboratory
glassware catalogs and a survival book titled the Hostile Planet: The 
Essential Guide to Surviving Natural Disasters, Pandemics and Terrorist 
Attacks. Recommendation: Remember the FDNY remains on the 
frontlines in the War on Terror. Members should be aware of this new 
global threat environment and potential implications. Evidence of this is 
g a 
d EMS 
y for applicability in identifying the role of the fire service in 
prevent omeland 
the recent arrest of a computer programmer in India who is accused of 
being a terrorist organizations media officer, reportedly traveling to the 
U.S. frequently for his employer without arousing any suspicions.  
In an effort to increase information collection to share with the homeland security 
community, Commissioner Scoppetta pointed out, “We are in the process of creatin
curriculum that incorporates terrorism recognition awareness for all Firefighters an
personnel.”41 Chapter IV of this thesis analyzes the FDNY Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness Strateg
ing terrorism through information sharing with local, state, and federal h
security partners.42 
                                                 
40 Fire Department City of New York, “Watchline.” Watchline distribution is for official use only and 
inte
el and intelligence personnel. Further dissemination should be limited to a minimum, consistent 
with and security of installation personnel, equipment 
and f edia or any other agencies outside of law 
enfo
, 
f New York, “Terrorism.” 
nded for “law enforcement, EMS personnel, firefighting personnel, security personnel, antiterrorism 
personn
 the purpose of supporting effective law enforcement 
acilities. The Watchline is not to be furnished to the m
rcement. It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of 
Information Act (5 U.S.C 552) and/or the Freedom of Information Law (New York Public Officers Law, 
Sections 87 & 89).” 
41 Scoppetta, Testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
26-27. 
42 Fire Department City o
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enforce g  a whole 
picture
Intelligence is about the thousands and thousands of routine, everyday 
observations and activities. Surveillance, interactions—each of which may 
be taken in isolation as not a particularly meaningful piece of information, 
but when fused together, gives us a sense of the patterns and the flow that 
really is at the core of what intelligence analysis is all about...”44  
Since most of the nation’s firefighters live and work in the neighborhoods or 
communities they serve, they may be in a position to provide some of “the thousands of 
routine everyday observations and activities” necessary to prevent or disrupt terrorism.  
                                                
At the national level, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff made public an 
arrangement to include firefighters in fusion centers.43 Chertoff indicated that the 
National Operations Center includes a fire service representative who works with 
s from organizations such as the FBI, other law enforcement agen
ence community, and that Charlie Allen, the DHS assistant secretary for 
ence and analysis, “is working to add firefighter personnel to state and local 
.” Chertoff added, “Fusing firefighters and responders into the normal law 
ment and Counterterror Intelligence Fusion Center is critical to et
 of what’s going on.” Referring to intelligence as a means of providing early 
warning of terrorist attacks, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff stated: 
Intelligence, as you know, is not only about spies and satellites. 
 
43 Chertoff, Remarks at the International Association of Fire Chiefs.” Chertoff told the International 
Association of Fire Chiefs that at the DHS, “We’re trying to integrate fire operations into the very fabric of 
DHS. Our National Operation Center now has a fire desk. We now have a Fire Service representative 
sitting at the table with our interagency colleagues from the FBI, state and local law enforcement and the 
intelligence community whenever we deal with an operational challenge. We recognize that you have 
special insight. We want your input into the whole range of our operations, and your expertise whenever 
we’re dealing with a hazard.” 
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III. THE CURRENT FIRE SERVICE INFORMATION-SHARING 
ENVIRONMENT 
Nationally, fire departments have impressive staffing and capabilities. According 
to the National Fire Protection Association, total employment in firefighting occupations 
was 1,141,900 in 2006, of which more than 823,950 were part-time or volunteers.45 Of 
the 30,635 fire departments in the United States, 4,052 are career departments, while the 
majority of departments (26,583) are staffed by volunteers.46 Firefighters are often the 
first personnel at the scene of emergency incidents, where they perform a myriad of 
critical life-saving and property-conservation functions. Fire departments and firefighters 
are located throughout the country, from densely populated urban environments, 
residential neighborhoods and airports, to chemical plants, grasslands, forests, and large 
unincorporated areas.47 Research for this thesis revealed that as few as fifteen of the 
thirty thousand U.S. fire departments formally use terrorism indicators and communicate 
the information gathered in this manner to the homeland security community.  
Firefighters working and living in the communities they serve may be able to 
identify activities that in and of themselves may not be out of place from an outsider’s 
point of view, but to a firefighter who lives, works, and responds to emergencies in the 
area, they may be suspicious. The realization of numerous intelligence centers 
collaborating and distributing information to the emergency-services sector enhances 
information sharing with non-traditional consumers such as the fire service. I expect this 
trend to continue.  
The fire service strategies and legislative actions identified in this and other 
chapters were based on domestic and international information-sharing documents. The 
examples identified in this chapter help to define the current U.S. fire service role as a 
producer and consumer of terrorist-related information. Currently the draft National 
Strategy for the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise Concept of Operations (FSIE 
 
45 National Fire Protection Association, U.S. Fire Department Profile Through 2006. 
46 Ibid. 
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CONOPS) and the Fire Department City of New York Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness Strategy (FDNY Strategy) appear to be the only fire-specific U.S. 
information-sharing approaches available.  
A. INFORMATION-SHARING EXAMPLES AND SCENARIOS  
It appears that open source and Unclassified//For Official Use Only (U//FOUO) 
information regarding the identification and sharing of potential information is limited 
but increasing in quantity and quality. A number of U//FOUO and sensitive examples 
were shared with the author of this thesis under the condition that they not be used in an 
open source thesis. In an effort to provide this thesis to the widest audience possible, only 
open source or open source approved U//FOUO examples were used in this thesis. 
To identify the current level of information sharing between the fire service and 
the homeland security community, I began by researching terrorist-related information 
using the National Fire Information System (NFIRS). NFIRS appeared to be a good 
choice because it represents the world’s largest, national, annual database of fire service 
response information. Over twenty-one thousand fire departments participate in the 
NFIRS. The participating departments report an average of fourteen million incidents and 
one million fires each year.48 Any potential terrorist data entered would be 
complemented by over two hundred other fire- or emergency-related fields and could
mined for terrorism trends and patterns. Unfortunately, several NFIRS subject matter 




48 U.S. Fire Administration, About INFIRS. The NFIRS database comprises more than one half of all 
reported fires that occur annually. The current NFIRS 5.0 version includes incident and casualty forms, a 
coding structure for data processing purposes, manuals, computer software and procedures, documentation, 
and a National Fire Academy training course for utilization of NFIRS. NFIRS allows participating local 
fire departments to fill out incident, casualty, and optional reports for fires and other event types as they 
occur. 
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database.49 Apparently, the NFIRS database does not have fields for terrorist, terrorism, 
or suspicious related activities, and it is not possible to conduct a free text search of the 
narratives.  
After unsuccessful attempts to query hundreds of thousands of emergency 
incidents in the NFIRS database for suspicious terrorist related information, I received an 
Emergency Management and Response—Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
(EMR-ISAC) e-mail that discussed emerging issues regarding firefighters sharing 
information with the law enforcement community. I contacted the EMR-ISAC 
representative for the Emergency Services Sector and discussed the current role of the 
fire service in preventing terrorism through information sharing with local, state, and 
federal homeland security partners. The EMR-ISAC representative agreed to research the 
issue. Like the NFIRS results, the EMR-ISAC research did not result in examples of 
information sharing between the fire departments and homeland security.  
The EMR-ISAC representative recommended that I contact a senior intelligence 
analyst with DHS in Washington, D.C. After several phone conversations and e-mails, 
the DHS intelligence analyst provided me with the one example of successful information 
sharing that was a result of the DHS-sponsored New Mexico technology course, Incident 
Response to Suicide Bombings (IRTSB).  
A member of a local fire department had attended the IRTSB class in Playas, New 
Mexico. The local fire department responded to a location for a “Smoke Condition” 
inside a building. During their check of the building for smoke, which proved to be 
negative, the firefighters came across fourteen one-gallon plastic containers filled with an 
unknown substance. The on-scene commander requested the Haz Mat unit, and upon 
their arrival, they determined the substance in the containers to be urine. The Incident 
Commander did not think anything of it, nor did the police supervisor at the scene. 
However, the member of the Haz Mat unit that had attended the IRSTB class indicated 
that the urine could be a component of a bomb, and because of this, the fire department 
contacted the FBI. Further searches of the house turned up an additional twenty empty 
 
49 Personal communication with National Fire Information Reporting System Board Member John 
Williams and Oklahoma City Fire Department Information Technology Captain Jim Kruta, February 





                                                
containers and maps and train schedules of the New York metropolitan area. The tenant 
of the apartment was taken into custody by the FBI. At the time of this writing, the FBI 
investigation continues.  
Internationally, several open-source information-sharing examples were identified 
during the preparation of this thesis. In 1995 an assassination attempt on the Pope by Al 
Qaeda operatives in Manila, Philippines was thwarted when a fire in the terrorists’ rented 
hotel room tipped authorities to the attack.50 Also, on June 29, 2007 a London-based 
ambulance crew “saw smoke coming from the green Mercedes…The ambulance had 
been called to the nightclub—where up to 1,700 people were inside…they spotted smoke, 
now believed to be vapour, inside the car.” The ambulance crew shared the information 
with local law enforcement. After securing the area, Scotland Yard detonated the car, 
which contained sixty liters of gasoline, gas cylinders and nails.51 
B. TERRORISM INDICATORS 
Key to enhancing the current information-sharing environment are firefighters 
conducting operations with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to identify potential 
terrorist activities and to share the information with the appropriate homeland security 
partners. Uninformed firefighters acting without the benefit of the necessary knowledge, 
skills, and abilities may incur legal and civil rights violations of the people the 
firefighters have sworn to protect. A review of federal, state, local, public, and private 
open-source terrorism-prevention programs relating to the identification, collection, and 
communication of terrorist indicators resulted in over one hundred fifty different terrorist 
 
50 Posner, Why America Slept, 86–89. 
51 British Broadcasting (BBC) News, “Police Avert Car Bomb Carnage.” 
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indicators to look for.52 The following four indicators were prevalent in the prevention 
programs studied and are recommended for use by the U.S. fire service: 
 Suspicious behavior: especially unusual nervousness for the situation and 
inappropriate or lack of eye contact. 
 Unusual supplies for occupancy type (structure or vehicle): especially storing 
large amounts of chemicals, cash, electronics. 
 Unusual documents for the occupancy type: especially maps, books, blueprints, or 
literature of critical infrastructures. 
 Intelligence gathering: especially surveillance, taking pictures, video, notes, 
asking questions, attempting to gain access. 
The use of the four common terrorist indicators combined with firefighter entry 
onto or into private property during emergency and non-emergency operations may place 
firefighters in a unique position to legally gather potential terrorist-related information in 
plain sight.  
C. OPERATIONAL AND CITIZEN TRUST ISSUES 
There are several issues relating to the current level of information collection, 
collaboration, and dissemination relative to citizen trust and operational information 
sharing. For example, firefighters should limit the use of terrorism indicators to those 
areas and circumstances within the scope of their primary emergency or non-emergency 
duties. Also, firefighters may need to become consumers of intelligence and related 
information in preparation for and in response to potential terrorist incidents at specific 
locations or special events. For the majority of the fire service and intelligence 
community, the current information-sharing environment may be informal at best and 
may not address strategic, legal, training, and operational issues adequately.  
 
52 Eleven federal, state, and local organizations were reviewed for the identification of terrorist 
indicators that might be applicable for use by the U.S. fire service. The organizations were the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, New York City State Metropolitan Transportation System, Real Estate 
Board of New York, New York City Fire Department, New York State Office of Public Security, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizens Emergency Response Corps, 
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Center for Defense and Homeland Security, Emergency 






                                                
Currently, most fire departments operate on the legal premise that firefighters 
enter homes, businesses, vehicles, and other assets without warrants during emergency 
and non-emergency duties in their efforts to prevent and respond to life and property loss. 
This access may place them in a position to legally identify criminal activities or 
information in plain sight and to report the information to the appropriate homeland 
security partners. For example, in Oklahoma City if firefighters respond to a fire in the 
kitchen area, and while searching for victims or ventilating the structure, the firefighters 
notice a potential methamphetamine lab in the bedroom, the police department will be 
contacted. If children are present, the Department of Human Services will be notified.  
The identification and sharing of potential terrorist indicators during non-
emergency fire department operations presents other considerations. Virtually every city 
and town in America that has a paid fire department conducts mandatory fire inspections 
in businesses and offers non-mandatory inspections in homes. Fire- and life-safety code 
inspection local ordinances and state laws vary, but generally speaking firefighters may 
enter a business or rental property for periodic, routine, or complaint-driven inspections. 
Complaints are often received from citizens, employees, local law enforcement, and other 
city departments. All fire inspections require the implied or overt consent of the 
occupant. If the occupant denies consent, a warrant will be required unless an emergency 
condition exists.53 Fire- and life-safety code inspections typically require examination of 
virtual all structural areas of a property. Use of the four common terrorism indicators may 
assist firefighters in recognizing potential terrorist activities during emergency operations 
and non-emergency fire- and life-safety inspections. 
Another significant consideration relating to potential terrorist information 
sharing involves the trust that Americans have in their local fire departments and 
firefighters. Many paid and volunteer fire departments benefit from very high levels of 
citizen satisfaction and confidence. In some areas a community’s identity is, in part, 
directly linked to its local fire department. This trust, if broken, could result in a long- 
 
 
53 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
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term negative effect to fire departments’ and fire services’ core mission to save lives and 
property. The National Strategy for Information Sharing commented on the issue of trust 
in the following statement: 
While State and local officials work to prevent future terrorist attacks, they 
still must arrest criminals, put out fires, respond to traffic accidents, and 
deal with a host of public health and safety issues. Success in these 
endeavors depends on a strong partnership with the public, built on a 
foundation of communication and trust between local officials and the 
members of their community. These same partnerships will be used to 
protect these communities from future attacks by terrorists.54 
If firefighters enter premises primarily to obtain terrorism information, there is a 
distinct possibility that any information shared with the homeland security community 
would constitute an illegal search and violate the occupant’s civil rights.55 Firefighters 
must have a legitimate reason within the scope of their assigned emergency and non-
emergency duties to enter a premise. If firefighters have legitimate emergency or non-
emergency motives for conducting operations on or in private or public property, any 
potential terrorism indicators in plain sight during a firefighter’s activities should be 
shared through a standardized process with the homeland security community.56  
One potentially simple system is for firefighters to report suspicious, non-time-
sensitive information to the local intelligence community. The four terrorist indicators 
identified in this thesis could be informally or formally reported by the Incident 
Commander or senior fire official, to the fire marshal, local law enforcement 
representative, Joint Terrorism Task Force, fusion center, or other pre-identified 
intelligence-collecting entity. 
For many years it has been a common practice in many U.S. fire departments to 
share information relating to potential illegal activities with the law enforcement 
 
54 White House. National Strategy for Information Sharing, 17.  
55 “The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through the 
Fourteenth, through its prohibition of ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials,” Camara, 387 U.S. at 528. 
56 Masse, “Homeland Security Intelligence,” 12. “Given that there are substantial national and 
homeland security penalties for not sharing homeland security intelligence, at least at the policy level and 
to some extent at the operational level, arguably there is now a bias in favor of sharing raw intelligence 
across levels of government more quickly than in the past. The extent to which this information is shared 





community. This collaboration has occurred at emergency and non-emergency 
operations. At non-emergency operations such as fire code inspections, firefighters might 
report large quantities of explosives, chemicals, or firearms at businesses that typically do 
not handle those products. For emergency scenes the reporting of meth labs or their 
precursors, or domestic violence as a mechanism of injury, might be the catalyst for 
notifying the local law enforcement agency.  
If the homeland security community, including law enforcement, requests the fire 
department to inspect a specific location for fire code violations and anything unusual 
that might be in plain sight, is the fire department now illegally collecting intelligence or 
sharing information gained in the course of its duties? An example of an illegal collection 
plan occurred in Oklahoma City. In 2007 a law enforcement representative approached 
an Oklahoma City firefighter and inquired if he would conduct a fire inspection at a local 
mosque in order to identify potential terrorist-related information. Fortunately, the 
firefighter’s supervisor realized the legal exposure associated with the plan and denied 
permission to the firefighter to participate. One aspect of determining whether 
information collected by a firefighter is legal or “fruit of a poisonous tree” may lie in 
whether the firefighter was a sensor of opportunity or whether he was assigned the 
specific task of collecting information on suspected terrorists.  
D. FIRE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE  
In September of 2007, DHS coordinated a conference with over eighty executives 
from the fire service, public safety, homeland security, and intelligence communities to 
discuss the development of a national strategy for fire service intelligence and 
information sharing. Over the next nine months, fire department representatives who had 
attended the conference continued to meet and developed a set of recommendations for 
the development of the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE). In December of 2008, 




                                                
direction in clarifying the role of the fire service in preventing terrorism and enhancing 
preparedness through information sharing with local, state, and federal homeland security 
partners.   
The FSIE CONPLAN envisioned a national network of fire service and homeland 
security organizations that share all hazard information and intelligence in a collaborative 
effort to enhance the national prevention, preparation, response, and recovery missions.57 
The current mission of the FSIE CONPLAN is to: 
Establish an institutionalized Fire Service information and intelligence 
sharing framework that will enhance the preparedness level of fire 
departments across the country while supporting the prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery efforts of all homeland security 
partners.58 
To date, the FSIE initiative is the only national strategic approach to information 
sharing between the U.S. fire service and homeland security community. Homeland 
security affiliates for the FSIE were identified within the FSIE framework as federal, 
state, local, tribal, and private sector “agencies or organizations that are stakeholders of 
FSIE initiatives, either as collaborators or customers” for the DHS.59 The FSIE 
CONPLAN appeared to be a strategic extension and formal expansion of the current 
informal fire service information-sharing environment between the fire service and 
homeland security communities. The primary FSIE venues for sharing information were 
federal, state, and local fusion centers. Working within the Global Justice Information 
Sharing Initiative, fire service fusion center liaisons or representatives would act as 
nodes, and the fusion centers would act as hubs for receiving and disseminating relevant 
information in a timely and actionable manner.60  
 
57 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 
Program Office, Draft Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise Concept Plan. 
58 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 
Program Office, Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise—Executive Briefing, 2. 
59 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 
Program Office, Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise—Executive Briefing, 4. 





                                                
The FSIE CONPLAN is an important, new, and distinct course in clarifying the 
role of the fire service in preventing terrorism through information sharing with local, 
state, and federal homeland security partners and was based on four pillars: 
 Identification of the types of intelligence and dissemination mechanisms that the 
fire service needs to enhance all-threat/all-hazard preparedness and to support fire 
service response and recovery operations. 
 Identification of the way in which the Fire Service can contribute to local and 
national homeland security all-threat/all-hazard prevention and protection efforts. 
 Collaborative development of an information/intelligence-sharing network within 
the fire service, and between the fire service and the homeland 
security/intelligence community, while ensuring the protection of citizen privacy 
and civil rights/civil liberties. 
 Identification of a pool of fire service subject-matter experts to serve as advisors 
for DHS initiatives that involve or affect fire service interests.61  
The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)-coordinated FSIE initiative 
represents a logical progression in maximizing the current homeland security 
information-sharing culture. Given the current and future threat environments in this 
long-term conflict sometimes called the global war on terrorism, it might be careless or 
even negligent not to build on the FSIE’s work to incorporate over one million 
firefighters into the information-sharing community.62  
E. CURRENT FIRE SERVICE INFORMATION-SHARING FACTORS 
The current ad hoc or informal U.S. fire service information-sharing environment 
was the initial information-sharing option evaluated for this thesis. Each of the four 
 
61 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 
Program Office, Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise—Executive Briefing, 4. 
62 In Chapter VI of this thesis, the FSIE CONPLAN is compared with other strategies and the current 
fire service/DHS information-sharing environment. In Chapter VII much of the FSIE CONPLAN Purpose, 
Desired End State and Goals and Objectives are integrated into the Fire Service/Homeland Security 
Information-Sharing Tool and Power vs. Interest Grid to provide recommended strategic structure and 
direction to the current ad hoc information sharing arrangements. 
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information-sharing options (current fire service, FSIE, FDNY Strategy, and CCA) 
examined for this thesis is qualitatively evaluated and then graphically represented by an 
information-sharing matrix based on five factors. The five factors are legal compliance, 
political acceptability, target capabilities linkage, operational impact, and cost. In Chapter 
VI, each information-sharing option is incorporated into an inclusive matrix that 
compares and contrasts all four information-sharing options. 
1. Legal Compliance 
The legality of current information-sharing practices is questionable, since most 
firefighters do not know what terrorism indicators to look for, when to look for them, or 
how to report them. Given that most firefighters are not actively aware of or engaged in 
reporting potential terrorist indicators, the fire service has not created any significant 
legal exposure or civil-liberties violations. Based on Masse’s findings, the fire service has 
a legal responsibility to report suspicious activity.63 In December 2007 the ACLU raised 
questions regarding firefighters’ collecting and sharing potential terrorist information. 
The ACLU position indicated excessive potential loss of personal privacy rights would be 
the result of firefighters’ collecting and sharing information.64 Based on the court cases 
and public law identified in Chapter II of this thesis, firefighters have a legal right and the 
responsibility to collect and share potential terrorist-related information if the information 
is in plain sight during the course of their assigned duties. The current limited level of 
terrorism prevention awareness and training of the fire personnel may indicate the role of 
the U.S. fire service in collecting and sharing information (or not) is within the law. 
2. Political Acceptability 
Applicability of the current fire service information-sharing environment to the 
U.S. public, policy groups, labor unions, governmental agencies, and other related 
organizations is in the early stages of development. At the national level, DHS Secretary 
 
63 Masse, “Homeland Security Intelligence,” 12. 
64 Olberman, interview with Mike German. See also National Terror Alert Response Center, 
Firefighters to Help In Fight Against Terrorism; Miller, More Media Reaction to FIRE-INT (Intel gathered 





                                                
Michael Chertoff made public an arrangement to include firefighters in fusion centers. 
Chertoff told the International Association of Fire Chiefs that at the DHS,  
We’re trying to integrate fire operations into the very fabric of DHS. Our 
National Operation Center now has a fire desk. We now have a Fire 
Service representative sitting at the table with our interagency colleagues 
from the FBI, state and local law enforcement and the intelligence 
community whenever we deal with an operational challenge. We 
recognize that you have special insight. We want your input into the whole 
range of our operations, and your expertise whenever we’re dealing with a 
hazard.65 
Chertoff went on to say that Charlie Allen, the DHS Assistant Secretary for 
Intelligence and Analysis, “is working to add firefighter personnel to state and local 
fusion centers” and that “fusing firefighters and responders into the normal law 
enforcement and Counterterror Intelligence Fusion Center is critical to get a whole 
picture of what’s going on.” 
Fire service information sharing and collaboration may be at the initial federal 
political stages of a significant future homeland security partnership, if one considers the 
scope and influence of the U.S. fire service.66  
3. Target Capabilities Linkage 
Of the four information-sharing target capabilities selected for this project, the 
current fire service role in the homeland security information-sharing environment 
formally utilizes only the CBRNE detection-capabilities component through the DHS 
FY-2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP). The SHSGP also provided 
the most significant cost-related support to the current fire service–Homeland Security 
information-sharing environment.  
 
65 Chertoff, Remarks at the International Association of Fire Chiefs, October 26, 2007.  
66 National Fire Protection Association, The United States Fire Service; U.S. Fire Administration, Fire 
Departments. The United States has over one million firefighters serving in over thirty thousand fire 
departments that respond to over twenty-four million emergencies each year.  
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4. Operational Impact 
The operational impact of the current information-sharing environment was 
difficult to assess as the current information-sharing strategies and programs are new, 
limited, and emerging. The existing role of the fire service within the intelligence cycle 
doesn’t appear to have parameters for success or failure or specifics for associated 
budgets. The anecdotal successes associated with information sharing among homeland 
security and the emergency services, combined with the recent emergence of strategies 
and technical assistance programs suggest that there is a heightened awareness and 
increased opportunity to identify potential terrorists or specific terrorist targets or events. 
For example, the following Daily Open Source Briefing is an example of how heightened 
awareness among first responders impacted the Republican National Convention.  
On the second day of the RNC, a Twin Cities paramedic spotted an 
“ambulance” with unusual generic markings in the city of Saint Paul. The 
medic had attended RNC briefings on the need for heightened awareness. 
The medic reported the location of the vehicle he had seen to a supervisor, 
and Saint Paul police were dispatched to investigate. Police found the 
vehicle unlocked; inside they found a large cache of weapons, bags of 
urine and feces, and related items to cause criminal damage to property. 
Saint Paul Police turned the fake ambulance over to the Secret Service. 
This find was invaluable to authorities and went a long way toward 
keeping people safe.67 
One labor organization that may have an operational impact is the International 
Association of Firefighters (IAFF). The IAFF represents over two hundred eighty 
thousand members in the United States and Canada. The IAFF offers terrorism response 
training for its members but has been silent on the issue of firefighters’ role in the 
terrorism-prevention mission.  
5. Costs 
The SHSGP provided financial assistance for the purchase of specialized 
equipment to enhance the capability of state and local agencies to prevent and respond to 
incidents of terrorism involving the use CBRNE weapons. The SHSGP also allowed for:  
 
67 East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group and Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center, 





the protection of critical infrastructure and prevention of terrorist 
incidents; for costs related to the design, development, conduct, and 
evaluation of CBRNE exercises; for costs related to the design, 
development, and conduct of a state CBRNE training program; and for 
costs associated with updating and implementing each state’s homeland 
security strategy.68 
Funds were awarded to and distributed through State Administrative Agencies 
designated by the governor of each state.69 Total funding provided through the SHSGP 
was $566 million.70 Since 2003 SHSGP funding has brought together state and local 
officials from throughout the emergency services sector to share information on their 
response needs and to collaborate on eligible purchases. 
The matrix below is a graphic that identifies and broadly qualifies the current 
extemporized fire service/homeland security information-sharing environment. With the 
recent emergence of the FSIE, it is probable that current fire service information-sharing 
interests will be incorporated into national standards, protocols, and mechanisms for 
homeland security information and intelligence exchange.71 Therefore, the FSIE was 
considered as a separate and distinct information sharing option.  


















Low/Average Average Low Unacceptable Low 
FSIE High Unknown Good Unknown Average
 
Figure 1.   Current Fire Service and FSIE Information-Sharing Matrix 
                                                 
68 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FY 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program, 1.  
69 Ibid., 5. 
70 Ibid. 
71 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 
Program Office, Draft Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise Concept Plan, 1. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
Like many components of homeland security, the legal, moral, and ethical 
standards associated with firefighters sharing information are evolving. As the idea of 
information sharing among non-traditional intelligence cohorts progresses, there are a 
number of strategic and operational challenges to be considered. Based on the increase in 
informal and anecdotal information-sharing awareness, the advent of the FSIE, and FSIE 
CONPLAN identified in this chapter, the role of the fire service in sharing and receiving 
information with local, state, and federal homeland security partners may be increasing. 
For example, a small number of firefighters are participating in national, state, or local 
fusion centers where they operate as intelligence analysts and liaisons to the intelligence 
community. With that said, overall, it appears that the majority of firefighters have not 
received instruction on who, when, or how to report suspicious activity. Furthermore, the 
legal and moral responsibilities associated with firefighters gathering and sharing 
information has produced a range of estimations about what, if any, terrorist-related 
information collection and consumption firefighters should be involved in.72 The DHS 
Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local Program Office appears to be taking a lead 
role in developing and coordinating information-sharing partnerships. In Chapter IV, I 
will review the New York City Fire Department’s Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness 
Strategy and qualify it based on the five information-sharing factors identified for this 
thesis (legal compliance, political acceptability, target capabilities linkage, operational 
impact and costs). 
 
72 National Terror Alert Response Center, Firefighters to Help in Fight Against Terrorism; Edwards 
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IV. NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT TERRORISM AND 
DISASTER PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY 
The lack of information sharing on 9/11 may have resulted in unwarranted 
fatalities for civilians, firefighters and other responders. The National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, also known as The 9/11 Commission, stated:  
Just as in the North Tower, callers from below and above the impact zone 
were advised to remain where they were and wait for help. The operators 
were not given any information about the inability to conduct rooftop 
rescues and therefore could not advise callers that they had essentially 
been ruled out. This lack of information combined with the general advice 
to remain where they were, may have caused civilians above the impact 
not to attempt to descend, although stairwell A may have been passable.73 
Regarding information-sharing with Fire Department, City of New York (FDNY), 
FDNY fire chiefs testifying to the 9/11 Commission reported that the lack of information 
sharing, particularly between the fire command staff and the police helicopter, adversely 
impacted operations.74 
As a direct result of 9/11, the FDNY released their comprehensive Terrorism and 
Disaster Preparedness FDNY Strategy (FDNY Strategy) in 2007. Based on my review of 
the FDNY Strategy, the fire department has taken steps to operate safely and effectively 
using information sharing in the post-9/11, multifaceted, all-hazards threat environment. 
The following statement in the FDNY Strategy indicates that the fire department is in a 
position to address a number of the information-sharing challenges within the homeland 
security community.  
An examination of the events leading to 9/11 highlighted many gaps in 
information-gathering capabilities and information-sharing protocols 
within the homeland security community. The FDNY recognized that the 
Department could help to fill some of these gaps by contributing to local 
intelligence-gathering efforts. When routinely shared with intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies, the information gathered by FDNY personnel 
 
73 National Commission, 295. 
74 Ibid., 321. “Information that was critical to informed decision making was not shared among 
agencies. FDNY Chiefs in leadership roles that morning have told us their decision making capability was 






the FDNY Strategy.  
                                                
could make a significant contribution to existing intelligence and lead to 
the identification and disruption of terrorist activities. Terrorism-related 
information can be gathered by the FDNY in many ways. During the 
course of routine building inspections, arson investigations and response 
to fires and medical emergencies, FDNY personnel have unique access to 
homes and building that generally are concealed from outsiders.75 
According to FDNY Commissioner Scoppetta and Fire Chief Cassano, the FDNY 
leadership employed the insight and skills from a cross section of FDNY’s fifteen 
thousand–person work force to develop the FDNY Strategy. The FDNY Strategy was 
designed to provide direction and unity toward enhanced preparedness.76  
A. ELEMENTS OF THE FDNY STRATEGY 
The FDNY Strategy is organized around four chapters. Chapter 1 (Strategy and 
Purpose) addresses the foundation of preparedness based on the current and future threat 
environment for man-made and natural disasters. Chapter 2 (mission and focus) examines 
the life-safety oriented work and focus of the FDNY, based on pre-determined significant 
issues that must be addressed to achieve the pre-identified levels of preparedness. 
Chapter 3 (Operational Readiness) describes how the FDNY ensures that firefighters 
have “the tools, training and support they need to do their job.”77 Chapter 3 also 
identifies a number of the National Preparedness Goal components to assist FDNY 
firefighters in achieving the evaluation points identified in Chapter 4 of the FDNY 
Strategy. The National Preparedness Goal components identified in the FDNY Strategy 
are “planning; organization and leadership; equipment and systems; training; exercises, 
evaluations and corrective actions; and personnel.”78 Chapter 4 (Coordination and 
Evaluation) is the final chapter of the FDNY Strategy and utilizes an “FDNY Strateg
Cycle” to provide a systematic approach in identifying hazards, evaluating risks, 
implementing control measures and evaluating 
 
75 Fire Department City of New York, “Terrorism,” 20. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 8. 
78 Ibid. 
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1. Evaluation Points 
The FDNY Strategy control measures involve Evaluation Points, which are 
specific performance goals and objectives for the FDNY. On the whole, the FDNY 
Strategy appears to be designed to describe how FDNY will achieve all-hazards 
organizational preparedness and response to man-made and large-scale natural 
emergencies. All chapters include information-sharing practices.  
The FDNY Strategy postulates that man-made and natural disasters can occur 
throughout New York City, “from the top floors of a high-rise building to a train car in a 
tunnel, aboard a ship docked in a port or in a crowded street.”79 Due to the diverse threats 
faced by the FDNY, the focus of preparedness in New York City was based on an all-
hazards approach that incorporated “terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies.”80  
2. Breaking Points 
To address the numerous man-made and natural risks the FDNY relied upon an 
all-hazard, capabilities-based planning approach to address a wide range of challenges 
and FDNY fiscal constraints. The FDNY Strategy also considered FDNY’s “breaking 
points” or the point at which FDNY’s considerable resources would be unable to meet the 
demands of a large scale or complex emergency response.81 The need for pre-incident 
information sharing with external partners to assist with filling anticipated response gaps 
is evident in the following statement:  
 
 
79 Fire Department City of New York, “Terrorism,” 9.  
80 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Preparedness Goal, 3. 
81 Fire Department City of New York, “Terrorism,” 11. “A breaking point is the point at which 
operational needs exceed organizational capability (what FDNY can do), capacity (how much FDNY can 
do), proficiency (how well FDNY can do it) and/or deployment (how rapidly FDNY can do it).… The 
Department must examine breaking points in terms of capability (an incident may require tasks FDNY is in 
the best position to execute, but does not yet have the full ability to perform); capacity (an incident may 
require more resources than available); proficiency (an incident may require skills greater than the level 






                                                
Members also must recognize that not all response gaps can be reasonably 
filled by the FDNY alone. The complexity and scale of a worst-case 
scenario incident will require assets and abilities beyond those that could 
be acquired and sustained over the long-term by any single organization.82 
Based on FDNY resources, the FDNY Strategy’s capabilities-based planning 
approach required prioritization of assets for all-hazard preparedness. Specifics of the 
capabilities-based planning process are discussed in further detail later in this chapter. 
B. INFORMATION-SHARING TACTICS  
As the new preparedness reality relates to information-sharing smart practices in 
preventing terrorism through information sharing, the fire service may wish to consider 
the FDNY’s information-sharing enterprise that consolidates voice, video, and data 
information from multiple internal and external sources at a centralized command center. 
The system may have application to the current DHS interoperability initiatives.83  
The FDNY’s preparedness tactics include the importance of effectively sharing 
information internally among the thousands of FDNY fire personnel as well as externally 
among the homeland security community. Regarding terrorist threats, the FDNY 
considered modern terrorist capabilities to include the use of unconventional (chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear) weapons, as well as improvised explosive devices 
and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.84  
 
82 Fire Department City of New York, “Terrorism,” 11. 
83 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Science and Technology, Interoperability 
Initiatives Fact Sheet. “Emergency responders—police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical 
service personnel—need to exchange voice and data communications across disciplines and jurisdictions to 
successfully respond to day-to-day incidents and large-scale emergencies. Many people assume that 
emergency response agencies across the Nation are already interoperable. In actuality, emergency 
responders often cannot talk to some parts of their own agencies—let alone communicate to agencies in 
neighboring cities, counties, or states. Interoperability is a complex, multidimensional challenge involving 
cultural, technological, and financial factors. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is addressing 
capability gaps through the Science and Technology Directorate’s Office for Interoperability and 
Compatibility (OIC) and the Directorate for National Protection and Programs’ Office of Emergency 
Communications (OEC). Through these programs, DHS is leading initiatives and providing tools that help 
local, tribal, state, and Federal emergency response agencies to accelerate interoperable communications 
progress.”  
84 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Preparedness Goal, 10. 
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The network-centric information-sharing system reportedly provides a 
comprehensive real-time picture of credible threats for strategic and tactical planning 
purposes. The network-centric information-sharing system is also designed to provide 
situational assessments to enhance tactical multiple incident command(s) activities for 
real-time threat intelligence and numerous situational images. Components of the 
information-sharing system include FDNY databases, imaging libraries, and field units, 
as well as integration with other local, state, and federal agencies, the private sector, and 
multiple media outlets. The FDNY Strategy indicated during the response phase of an 
incident, the network-centric command structure and related information-sharing among 
all homeland partners would improve situation awareness through information sharing 
during the escalating period of operational activities and provide a universal operating 
picture for the FDNY and other response partners. The hub of FDNY’s complex network-
centric information-sharing enterprise is the FDNY Operations Center that coordinates 
information sharing among Borough Communications Center, Field Communications 
System Mobile Command Centers, Geographic Information Systems, the Automatic 
Vehicle Locator System, live video feeds from public and private sectors, and networked 
connections to the DHS, FBI, NYPD, NYC Office of Emergency Management, and other 
city, state, and federal agencies.85  
Although the network-centric information-sharing system appears to be heavily 
technologically dependent and may require considerable buy in and collaboration from 
numerous diversified public and private partners, it has the potential to substantially 
increase life safety and property conservation at natural and intentional emergency 
events. Figure 2 is a graphic representation of the network-centric command system that 
is information-sharing dependent. Besides being useful at emergency incidents, the 
system could be used during specific large-scale assembly occupancies, special events, or 
other potential terrorist targets.  
 
85 Fire Department City of New York, “Terrorism,” 14. 
 Figure 2.   FDNY Network-Centric Command System 
The FDNY Strategy quantified emergency and non-emergency activities with the 
following statement: “Each year, FDNY units make approximately two million fire, 
medical and other emergency responses and 300,000 building inspections.”86 The 
millions of activities may be information-sharing opportunities to prevent or disrupt 
potential terrorism when the information shared is within the legal requirements 
described in this thesis.  
C. RISK ASSESSMENT 
The FDNY assesses critical infrastructure vulnerability using the Risk 
Assessment and Target Hazard program to collect, coordinate, and disseminate 
information. The program uses a database to provide comprehensive site information for 
incident planning and management by multiple homeland security partners. According to 
the FDNY Strategy, the Risk Assessment and Target Hazard unit is “working closely 
with the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection to ensure the risk assessment models 
                                                 






                                                
and databases FDNY produces follow national guidelines and can be integrated with 
national systems.”87 While the law enforcement disciplines study buildings and other 
structures from a security standpoint, the FDNY (and the U.S. fire service) could provide 
another aspect of vulnerability by analyzing the same structures from an all-hazards risk 
assessment with a primary focus on life safety and property conservation. The fire service 
assessments may enhance law enforcement and intelligence agency pre-incident planning 
as well as response incident stabilization operations. The FDNY may wish to incorporate 
the terrorist indicators identified in this thesis in concert with their pre-incident 
information-sharing programs to enhance their all-hazard threat analysis procedures and 
programs.  
D. BUREAU OF FIRE INVESTIGATION 
Another information-sharing asset of the FDNY is the Bureau of Fire 
Investigation. The FDNY Bureau of Fire Investigation was identified as a primary FDNY 
point of contact for information sharing with several homeland security community 
partners.  
The Bureau of Fire Investigation works closely with other law 
enforcement agencies and the intelligence community on threat analysis 
and complex incident investigations. Fire Marshals are members of 
numerous collaboration and intelligence networks, including the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and the FBI. The information FDNY Fire 
Marshals exchange through the JTTF not only aids in incident 
investigations, but also helps FDNY and all New York City security and 
response agencies prepare and prevent future incidents.88 
The FDNY Bureau of Fire Investigation also assists local law enforcement 
agencies in identifying and protecting emergency operations personnel from secondary 
attacks. FDNY fire marshals work closely with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force on 
threat analysis and complex incident investigations.89 These marshals have FDNY police 
 
87 Fire Department City of New York, “Terrorism,” 22. 






                                                
powers and according to the FDNY Strategy played a significant role in the 
investigations following the attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001. 
The rationale used in integrating the FDNY fire marshals as terrorism information 
coordinators or fusion center liaison officers with the homeland security intelligence 
community may have application on a national scale. Fire marshals may be well-suited to 
act as the local fire service points of contact for information sharing between the fire 
service and homeland security partners relating to potential illegal activity such as 
terrorism, clandestine drug labs, violent gangs, and other activities that might affect 
citizen and firefighter safety or fire department operations. 
E. COLLABORATION 
Chapter 3 (Operational Readiness) of the FDNY Strategy focuses on six of the 
DHS National Preparedness Goal elements. The six elements are planning; organization 
and leadership; equipment and systems; training; exercises, evaluations and corrective 
actions; and personnel. The FDNY relied on intra-departmental collaborative emergency 
response plans for “all-hazard complex incident scenarios” and the creation of continuity 
of operations plans to ensure stability and adequate personnel succession.90 The two 
plans collectively addressed emergency and non-emergency operations to effectively 
save lives and property before, during, and after long-term, high-resource, or complex 
incidents.  
The private- and public-sector collaboration required for the development of the 
plans is similar to the information-sharing requirements used by England’s Local 
Resilience Forums (see Chapter V of this thesis for more information on UK Civil 
Contingencies Act, Local Resilience Forums and Risk Registers). Both the FDNY and 
England’s system leverage informal internal and external information-sharing 
partnerships in the planning process in order to establish relationships prior to emergency 
response and to enhance resource utilization, communication and collaboration during 
mitigation, preparedness and response activities. Both systems also prescribed overall 
 
90 Fire Department City of New York, “Terrorism,” 22. 
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terrorism and disaster-preparedness systems that require civic, private, and homeland 
security (including fire departments) to prioritize capability goals and to ensure specific 
local or regional needs are identified using a collaborative and regimented all-hazards 
approach. 
F. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
The FDNY Strategy was the only one of the four information-sharing options 
(current fire service, FSIE, FDNY Strategy and CCA) evaluated that considered signal 
intelligence (SIGINT) sharing. The other three options (current information-sharing , 
FSIE and CCA) only identified human intelligence (HUMINT) information sharing. The 
FDNY Strategy considered enhancing information collection and sharing through the use 
of a diverse suite of small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance and 
possibly intervention operations. According to the FDNY strategy UAVs may have 
application in measuring chemical, biological, or nuclear quantities and limited 
chemical/biological neutralization in New York City’s urban environment.  
Building on the idea of the use of real-time signal intelligence to assist the U.S. 
fire service and their homeland security partners in sharing information, the application 
of the Naval War College’s Global Hawk–type system for use by the fire service and 
homeland security partners for real-time information sharing during or pre-planning of 
large scale natural, man-made disasters, including high-value terrorist targets, may be 
appropriate. Advantages of the Global Hawk system were identified in the following 
statement by David Hardesty in the September 2005 Naval War College Review.91 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) are likely to assume an increasing share of ISR responsibilities. 
“Specially designed UAVs have long loiter time, can be positioned 
flexibly near potential targets, and are small and relatively difficult to 
detect.” Global Hawk offers a sixty-five-thousand-foot operating altitude, 
thirty-six-hour endurance, and an integrated suite of electro-optic/infrared 
(EO/IR) and synthetic aperture radar/moving target indicator (SAR/MTI) 
sensors.… A tiered, networked constellation of UAVs could be fielded 
that included high-altitude, wide-area-surveillance UAVs working with 
medium and low-altitude tactical UAVs employing EO/IR and range-
 





                                                
gated laser radars.…UAVs, however, are not without limitations—
primarily cost, large-bandwidth communications, and low combat 
survivability.  
Based on the information from Hardesty, the application of a Global Hawk–type 
UAV system to all-hazards response by the U.S. fire service and DHS is significant. For 
example in late 2005 and early 2006, central Oklahoma experienced one of the most 
severe wildland fire seasons in its history. As one large wildland fire was progressing, the 
Unified Command used an available law enforcement helicopter to get an aerial view of 
the fire complex.92  
The aerial reconnaissance officer recognized that while numerous agencies and 
crews were working efficiently to extinguish a significant number of fire fronts, they 
were not working effectively. Many crews were suppressing fire in areas that could burn 
for days without loss of life or property while a few crews were working in an area that, 
if not extinguished within the next operational period, would eventually jeopardize 
hundreds of homes and thousands of residents. The Incident Action Plan was 
immediately modified to move firefighters from lower risk divisions to the division most 
susceptible to life and property loss.  
I propose that the Global Hawk or a similar system would allow Unified 
Commands the ability to see the big picture necessary to make better strategic decisions, 
forecast potential outcomes, and enhance responder accountability through geospatial 
awareness at significant natural or man-made disasters for long periods of time. The 
Global Hawk system could also assist in pre-event staging and logistical alignment at 
large-scale, high-value terrorist targets.  
G. INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION 
Another operational information-sharing program identified in FDNY Strategy 
was the development and dissemination of a department-wide weekly bulletin called 
 
92 Gibson, “Fire Ravages Oklahoma City.” “OKLAHOMA CITY, Okla. — Grassfires raged across the 
dry southern prairie Sunday, burning homes in Oklahoma City, destroying two small towns in Texas, and 
creating patchworks of flames as burning embers were blown by the gusting winds. Dozens of fires burned 
across the dry Oklahoma landscape as the wind gusts reached 50 mph.” 
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Watchline. The Watchline addresses all-hazard FDNY specific mitigation and response 
missions “to keep members abreast of new dangers and guard against complacency in the 
absence of new incidents.”93 Of all unclassified information-sharing bulletins, dispatches, 
notices, and info-grams reviewed for this thesis, the FDNY Watchline appeared to be the 
best fire service–specific product and should be recreated by the DHS for distribution to 
the U.S. fire service through the Emergency Management and Response Information-
sharing Analysis Center. Watchline is unique from a fire service perspective because the 
recommendations are tactically oriented, directed to the frontline firefighter, concise, and 
practical.  
H. FDNY STRATEGY INFORMATION-SHARING MATRIX  
Figure 3 identifies and grades the FDNY Strategy relating to the prevention and 


















Low/Average Average None Unacceptable Low 
FSIE High Unknown Good Unknown Average
FDNY 
Strategy 
High High High Average  Average
Figure 3.   FDNY Strategy Information Sharing Matrix 
I. FDNY STRATEGY INFORMATION-SHARING FACTORS 
The FDNY Strategy scored well based on three of the five information-sharing 
factors identified for this thesis. One reason was the FDNY Strategy is the only U.S. fire 
service–related information-sharing strategy that has been vetted through a process that 
includes three of the five information-sharing factors. The three factors on which the 
FDNY Strategy scored well are legal compliance, political acceptability, and target 
capabilities list linkage. 
                                                 





                                                
1. Legality and Political Acceptability 
The FDNY Strategy was developed in concert with the DHS Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis using the requirements or guidelines of numerous accepted 
local, state and federal documents. In an attempt to comply with the current legal and 
political homeland security environment, the FDNY Strategy worked with local and 
national homeland security partners and considered local and national information-
sharing related policies. Those policies most relevant to information sharing were: the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Preparedness Goal; New York City 
Office of Emergency Management’s Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS); 
National Response Plan; the New York City Urban Area Homeland Security’s Initial 
Assessment and FDNY Strategy; FDNY Management Indicator Reporting System; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan; U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget’s Guide to the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART); 
and U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 31, Section 115 (31 U.S.C. 1115).94 It also 
appears that the FDNY has a desire to build on legal and political acceptability as 
exemplified in the following statement:  
As the agency tasked with championing life safety within New York City, 
the FDNY is responsible for ensuring that mandates are effectively 
fulfilled. Additionally the Department also must continue to work with 
other City, State and Federal agencies , as well as the private sector, to 
enhance the quality, capability and cohesiveness of the City’s and nation’s 
overall ability to provide homeland security.95 
2. Target Capabilities Linkage 
FDNY, like many—if not all—of the Urban Area Security Initiative cities and 
regions, used the planning scenarios to enhance their protection and response missions 
and to compete for DHS grant funding. The FDNY Strategy exceeded the criteria for this 
thesis by identifying the role of the FDNY in all thirty-six target capabilities identified in 
 
94 Fire Department City of New York, “Terrorism,” D-1.  
95 Ibid.,19. 
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the National Preparedness Guidelines. Figure 4 below identifies the four information-
sharing thesis-specific target capabilities and the FDNY’s role. 
 
National Target Capability FDNY Role 
Intelligence Information Sharing and 
Dissemination  
 Joint Terrorism Task Force 
 Fusion Center 
 Inter-agency coordination (city, 
state, federal, and international) 
 Telecommunications and 
information technology 
CBRNE Detection  Routine field monitoring by Haz-
Mat teams 
 Data collection and analysis 
 Syndromic surveillance 
Intelligence Gathering and Recognition 
of Indicators and Warnings 
 Bureau of Fire Investigation 
 Building inspections 
 Inter-departmental liaisons 
 Syndromic surveillance 
Warnings, Intelligence Analysis, and 
Production 
 Watchline 
 Coordination with DHS Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis 
 Bureau of Fire Investigation 
Figure 4.   Target Capabilities List Linkage 
3. Operational Impact 
The FDNY Strategy may be a model for increasing the operational impact of the 
U.S. fire service in the all-hazards information-sharing environment. For example, the 
FDNY Bureau of Investigation maintains numerous important connections with the 
homeland security community, such as serving on the JTTF, working with the DHS 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, sharing pre-incident intelligence, filing observation 
reports and real-time incident updates with the NYC Fusion Center, keeping the FDNY 
leadership informed of current threats and how the FDNY can improve its contributions 
to New York City’s and the nation’s all-hazards preparedness. The FDNY fire marshals 
also share information at potential terrorist incidents by identifying and notifying first 






Another example of FDNY’s attempt to improve effectiveness is the development 
of a network-centric information-sharing–based command system that may someday 
significantly increase real-time information sharing among a myriad of local, state, and 
federal partners.  
The FDNY also identifies and communicates national and local information to 
fire personal and the homeland security community through Watchline.  
4. Costs  
The cost of developing and implementing the FDNY Strategy appears to have 
been incorporated into the operating budget and supplemented with DHS grant funding 
for equipment. For example, the cost of producing and distributing Watchline as well as 
the cost of the network-centric Command System appeared to have been developed 
within the FDNY FY 06–07 operating budget.  
J. RECOMMENDATIONS 
If the FDNY and the U.S. fire service are to be successful in preventing or 
disrupting terrorism through information sharing in the current and future terrorist 
environment, they must continue to implement and refine robust approaches like the 
FDNY Strategy that include measurable information-sharing components within fire 
departments and in conjunction with other emergency service–sector and private 
partnerships. The recommendations below from the FDNY Strategy may have 
application to the current U.S. fire service information-sharing environment. 
 Use of fire marshals as homeland security liaison officers with homeland security 
partners such as the JTTF, TWIG, FBI, fusion centers. 
 Use of fire marshals at potential terrorist emergency scenes to ensure the safety of 
workers relating to secondary devices and scene control. 
  Use of fire personnel to report common terrorist indicators in plain view, 
identified during normal emergency and non-emergency operations. 
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 Use of an integrated all-hazards Incident Command System–based information-
sharing system for all multi-discipline, multi-agency emergency responses and 
preparation for high-profile or target-rich special events. 
 If successful in New York City, consider expansion of the Risk Assessment and 
Target Hazard program for use by the U.S. fire service. The program could be 
coordinated and managed through the fifty-two fusion centers. 
 With permission of the FDNY, re-creation of Watchline by the Emergency 
Management and Response Information Sharing Analysis Center for distribution 
to the U.S. fire service. 
 Monitoring of the FDNY network-centric command system for applicability to 
the U.S. fire service.  
 Use of the Naval War College’s Global Hawk system (or other UAV platforms) 
by the fire service and homeland security partners for real-time information 
sharing during or in pre-planning large-scale natural or man-made disasters, 
including high-value terrorist targets.  
K. CONCLUSION 
The lack of information sharing on 9/11 appears to have been the catalyst for 
conducting a gap analysis of FDNY policy and procedures. The result was the FDNY 
Strategy. The product of FDNY’s efforts included a number of recommendations that 
may have applicability to U.S. fire service/homeland security information sharing. For 
this thesis, consideration was given to the components of the FDNY Strategy relative to 
information sharing in the prevention, protection, response, and recovery missions that 
may be replicable at local, state, or national levels. The FDNY Strategy processes and 
systems also became the catalyst for the recommendations section of this chapter. 
Analysis of the FDNY Strategy for this thesis also included an assessment relative to the 
five information-sharing factors and included a comparison of the FDNY Strategy to the 
current fire service information-sharing environment as well as the FSIE. Further analysis 





In the next chapter, England’s CCA is evaluated for security strategies, policies, 
and activities that may be used to assist U.S. fire departments and the homeland security 




play the lead role.  
                                                
V. UNITED KINGDOM CIVIL CONTINGENCIES ACT OF 2004 
(CCA) 
The CCA Part 1 identifies and assigns local arrangements for information sharing 
and formally recognizes fire department brigades as an integral part of England’s 
intelligence cycle. The CCA was the only international information-sharing document 
found that incorporated a role for the fire service. 
The CCA may be the most comprehensive single national fire service–related 
information-sharing document analyzed for this thesis. In contrast, the National 
Information Sharing Strategy96 released in October 2007 does not identify the U.S. fire 
service anywhere in its forty pages.97 In England the fire service roles and 
responsibilities regarding information sharing are clearly identified in the CCA and in 
some cases the fire service is mandated to 
The CCA is the product of a legislative evolution that began with the United 
Kingdom’s Emergency Powers Act of 1920 and continued with the 1948 Civil Protection 
Act. Following the fuel crisis and severe flooding that occurred in late 2000, and the 
outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in 2001, Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott 
initiated a review of the UK’s emergency-planning and information-sharing arrangements 
that included input from public, private, and governmental agencies. The result indicated 
that new legislation was needed to deliver a different structure for civil protection in the 
UK.98 The new structure needed to be capable of meeting the challenges associated with 
large-scale man-made or natural disasters. The bill received royal assent on November 
18, 2004, and became known as the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 (CCA).99 
 
96 White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing, 17. 
97 Ibid. “While State and local officials work to prevent future terrorist attacks, they still must arrest 
criminals, put out fires, respond to traffic accidents, and deal with a host of public health and safety issues. 
Success in these endeavors depends on a strong partnership with the public, built on a foundation of 
communication and trust between local officials and the members of their community. These same 
partnerships will be used to protect these communities from future attacks by terrorists.” 
98 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 
Short Guide, 1. 
99 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 





                                                
The CCA was designed to provide a single legislative point for wide-ranging 
protection of civilians and military from significant all-hazard disasters. Part One focuses 
on local arrangements for civil protections, and identifies the legal framework regarding 
the roles and responsibilities for local Level 1 and 2 responders. Level 1 responders are 
referred to as “core responders” and include emergency services such as police, fire, 
ambulance, maritime and coastguard agencies, as well as local authorities, environmental, 
and health care agencies.100 Category 2 responders or “co-operating responders” include 
utilities and transportation agencies.101  
Part Two of the CCA focuses on the emergency powers at the national and 
regional governmental levels and includes special legislative actions and authority at the 
policy level that may be needed to address the effects of significant events such as the 
London 7/7 subway bombings, or the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. Part Three 
addresses the general, fiscal, and administrative issues relating to implementing and 
maintaining the CCA.102  
A. ANALYSIS OF THE CCA 
This thesis analyzes Part One of the CCA relating to the role of England’s fire 
service as a core responder in the prevention of terrorism through information sharing to 
fulfill its civil protection duties with other Level 1 and 2 responders and the public. This 
chapter utilizes the sections of the CCA relevant to England specifically and does not 
consider the other UK countries of Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales.  
Besides the CCA itself, several companion documents were used in the analysis 
of the CCA for this thesis. Below is a synopsis of the CCA categories and regulations that 
 
100 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 
Short Guide, Annex A. Category 1 responders (“core responders”) for emergencies services incorporate the 
following: “Police forces, British Transport Police, Fire authorities, Ambulance services Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency, All principal local authorities (i.e. metropolitan districts, shire counties, shire districts, 
shire unitaries), Port Health Authorities, Health bodies, Primary Care Trusts, Acute Trusts, Foundation 
Trusts , and the Health Protection Agency.” 
101 Ibid. 
102 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 
Part I.  
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are used by England’s fire service and that may be applicable to the role of the U.S. fire 
service in the prevention or disruption of terrorism through information sharing with 
other emergency services and the homeland security community.103 
B. THE CCA AND INFORMATION SHARING  
In category one of the Contingency Planning regulations, fire brigades and other 
local responders were identified as “the building block of resilience in the UK and are 
subject to the full set of civil protection duties.”104 As core responders, England’s 
firefighters are required to play a significant and sometimes lead role in information 
sharing.  
In England, information sharing is a crucial element of preventing or disrupting 
terrorism “underpinning all forms of co-operation.”105 According to HM Government, 
Emergency Preparedness, Guidance on Part One of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004:  
Information sharing is necessary so that Level 1 and 2 responders are able 
to make the right judgments. If Level 1 and 2 responders have access to all 
the information they need, they can make the right decisions about how to 




103 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 
Contingency Planning Regulations 2005, Statutory Instrument 2005 No. 2042. The Civil Contingencies Act 
2004—Contingency Planning Regulations 2005 contain the regulations for the CCA and provided more 
information relating to the role of the U.S. fire service in preventing and disrupting terrorism through 
information sharing than the CCA did. Another useful document in the analysis of the CCA for this thesis 
was the UK Office of the Cabinet, Civil Contingencies Secretariat Civil Contingencies Act 2004 Short 
Guide, 57. CCA Part I regulations were organized around ten general categories and went into effect on 
November 14, 2005. Each of the ten categories of the regulations contained a varying number of specific 
regulations relating to that Part.  
104 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 
Short Guide. For the purposes of this thesis, English firefighters are required to “assess the risk of 
emergencies occurring and use this to inform contingency planning; Put in place emergency plans; Put in 
place Business Continuity Management arrangements; Put in place arrangements to make information 
available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise 
the public in the event of an emergency; Share information with other local responders to enhance co-
ordination; Co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency; and Provide 
advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business continuity management.”  
105 United Kingdom, HM Government Emergency Preparedness, 24-25. “Information is shared 
between Category 1 and 2 responders as they work together to perform their duties under the Act. 
Information sharing is a crucial element of civil protection work, underpinning all forms of co-operation. It 
may involve simple liaison between bodies keeping each other up to date on their current arrangements and 





                                                
their planning will be weakened. They will be less well placed to make 
judgments around cost-benefit analysis – what to plan for and what not to 
plan for.106  
The 57 CCA Part One regulations and related compliance documents may have 
the potential to assist in clarifying the role of the U.S. fire service in preventing terrorism 
through information sharing between local state and federal homeland security partners. 
The CCA Part One may also apply to U.S. fire departments in the identification, 
dissemination, and receipt of potential classified and “for official use only” 
information.107 
The CCA requires informal or alternative routes of information sharing based on 
dialogue and cooperation. If that is not the case, “it is probably evidence of a wider 
systemic failing in the way the CCA is operating in the local area in question.”108 Core 
and cooperating responders are required to consider alternative routes of information 
sharing before pursuing a formal information request to enhance cooperation in an effort 
to lessen the “over-bureaucratization of the information sharing process.”109 Currently 
the primary U.S. fire service/homeland security information-sharing environment is ad 
hoc or informal. One difference between England’s system and the U.S. system is that the 
CCA requires involvement of all core responders in the Local Resilience Forums and 
Risk Registers. For example Regulation 55 requires the London Fire and Emergency 
Planning Authority (Fire Brigade) to take lead responsibility for maintaining community 
Risk Registers and to assist with exercises and training. Regulation 56 requires other core 
responders that have functions in London to cooperate with the London Fire and 
Emergency Planning Authority. 
Mandatory Local Resilience Forum and Risk Register participation could create 
the setting for increased informal cooperation and information sharing. Due to DHS grant 
 
106 United Kingdom, HM Government Emergency Preparedness, 25. 
107 U.S. Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security Goal to Prevent and 
Disrupt Terrorist Attacks, 15.  
108 United Kingdom, HM Government Emergency Preparedness, 25.  
109 Ibid. 
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requirements involving regional collaboration, increased informal cooperation appears to 
have occurred in U.S. Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) regions, but may be almost 
non-existent outside of the UASI areas.  
C. THE CCA PROCESS 
Another way that England increases informal information sharing involves 
completion of a three-step process prior to formally requesting information from another 
entity. For example, the fire brigade requesting the information must first “be satisfied 
that it does not already hold the information, either by virtue of a previous request or 
because of informal information exchange.”110 Second, the fire brigade must ensure that 
the information is not available through common open-source information networks. 
Third, the fire brigade must attempt to exhaust all informal networks and agreements 
already established. In the United States this process would require the requesting fire 
department to think in terms of its needs based on risk assessments or other local 
planning efforts (LRFs and RRs in England) or in other words, to be a knowledgeable 
consumer before requesting information to assist it in meeting specific terrorist-
prevention goals or objectives that might not be readily available through established 
informal relationships. In England, if the local fire brigade is not able to obtain the 
information needed by conducting the steps above, CCA Regulations 47, 48, and 50 
describe the formal request procedures. 111  
 
110 United Kingdom, HM Government Emergency Preparedness, 26.  
111 Ibid., Annex 3B, 182. 
Figure 5 is the CCA guidance document template for formally requesting 
information.112  
 
Figure 5.   Information Request under the CCA  
                                                 





Once a formal request has been made, a formal response is required. Figure 6 is 




Figure 6.   Response to Information Requests under the CCA 
 
                                                
When instances of formalized information sharing might be necessary between 
the U.S. fire service and its homeland security partners, a template similar to the CCA
 






made to obtain the information through 












 or organizations and 
the consent necessary for different types of security information. 
                                                
examples in Figures 5 and 6 might be useful. Formal requests between the U.S. fire 
service and the U.S. information-sharing network may be a good alternative to informal
information sharing after every effort has been 
SHARING SENSITIVE INFORMATION 
Even though the presumption is that information should be shared informally, th
CCA—like the U.S. intelligence community—recognizes that, due to the sensitivit
some information, not all formal or informal information can be shared among all 
emergency responders. England’s system of communicating sensitive or classified 
information m
nity. 
When justified, the CCA allows for exceptions, exclusions, or denials of sen
information sharing between information-sharing partners where the disclosure of 
information would prejudice sensitive information, the disclosure would threaten nationa
security, or the intelligence service does not consent to disclosure.114 This arrangement 
does not appear to be much different from the current U.S. informal information-sharing 
experiences. If U.S. information is too sensitive, it can be redacted or modified to prot
sources or ongoing investigations while providing the fire service consumer with the 
information needed to increase awareness or to prepare for specific potential terrori
attacks. The New York City Fire Department Watchline appears to be the premier 
e of this type of fire service homeland security information-sharing product.  
In England formalized guidelines identifying the type of sensitive information an
consent needed are available. Figure 7 identifies the CCA persons
 
114 United Kingdom, HM Government Emergency Preparedness, 27.  
 
Figure 7.   England’s Sensitive Information-Sharing System 
 
In England the fire service and intelligence community utilize a network of fire 
liaisons (battalion chief–level in the United States) in combination with executive-level 
officers who have advanced intelligence clearances (fire chief– and deputy chief–level in 
the United States) to share sensitive information. The outcome is that information or 
intelligence that may result in “intelligence-led” operations is shared with fire 
departments and firefighters. Acting as an interface between the fire service and 
intelligence services, England’s fire chiefs with clearances can filter information to 
ensure that their organization receives information that is relevant and in a format that is 
of direct use. Sensitive information coming in a restricted format can only be viewed by 
liaisons or executive-level chief officers who put plans in place or disseminate 
information without revealing the sensitive/classified information. Often the chiefs stage 






a false alarm, the line officers and firefighters do not know precisely why—in effect 
protecting the source information and preventing undue public alarm while allowing the 
resources to be prepared.  
E. EXAMPLES OF INFORMATION-SHARING UNDER THE CCA  
The following are two examples of CCA information sharing among England’s 
Level 1 responders. 
One CCA-compliant "intelligence led" information-sharing operation involved 
ricin. The police had a number of terrorists under surveillance in a range of rented farm 
buildings in a rural area. Since the terrorists were known to be handling a number of 
precursor chemicals for the production of ricin intended to form part of a chemical 
weapon, the local fire department was put on standby before law enforcement specialist 
units carried out the raid. The communication structures and existence of trusted 
security–cleared officers meant that the fire department was able to prepare for a 
response in advance. The terrorists were arrested and are currently being housed in one of 
England’s high security prisons. Fire department hazardous-materials services were not 
needed. The fire crews deployed did not need to know the specifics of the intelligence 
operations, but their officers had all the plans and chemical data available to them in case 
hazardous-materials intervention was necessary. 
Another example of a potential terrorist-related incident involved a stolen van 
containing a radiation source for x-raying bridge structures. It was unclear whether the 
van had been stolen by terrorists who intended to use it as the basis for a dirty bomb, or 
whether it had been stolen by thieves who simply did not know what they had. Its 
description, registration number, and details were immediately transmitted to all 
emergency services, who were warned to be on the lookout for the van. Specific plans 
and guidance were put in place to deal with the radiological risks. It turned out to be a 
non-terrorist crime, and the issue never came to public notice. 
The following are two examples of CCA informal information sharing where the 
local fire brigade took a lead role in an all-hazards environment. 
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Similar to most U.S. fire departments, the Hereford and Worcester Fire and 
Rescue Services carry out routine inspections of buildings for fire-code purposes and to 
make operational plans. The difference is that Hereford and Worcester firefighters 
regularly share pre-plan information with other agencies and communicate suspicious 
processes or activities. For example, in a large historic house, the fire plan might involve 
salvaging of irreplaceable contents (paintings worth millions of dollars) before or in 
conjunction with fire suppression. The Hereford and Worcester Fire and Rescue 
representative liaisons, working with police and the owners of the art, ensure that if the 
firefighters need to conduct salvage operations ahead of or in conjunction with fire-
suppression operations, adequate arrangements would be put in place with the police and 
the owners to secure the contents from theft.  
England’s reported routine sharing of information between Level 1 and 2 
responders has sometimes identified all-hazard issues that would otherwise have gone 
unnoticed. For example, when considering the impact of major coastal flooding, the fire 
service identified that the area could lose power. Informal information sharing with Level 
2 responders revealed that the loss of power would cause the land drainage pumps to be 
inoperable, and this would cause flooding on an even greater scale than the initial 
inundation. 
In England, whenever there is a major alert in relation to non-terrorist events, 
such as floods or avian flu, the lead government agency provides national briefings. The 
briefings have developed into a system of “common risk information pictures” or CRIP 
briefings issued to all Level 1 responders. The briefings are provided in a common format 





F. CCA INFORMATION-SHARING MATRIX 
 The matrix below identifies and grades the CCA relative to the other three 

















Low/Average Average Low Unacceptable Low 
FDNY 
Strategy 
High High High Average  Average
FSIE High Unknown Good Unknown Average
CCA Unknown Good Average Good High 
Figure 8.   Information-Sharing Matrix for the CCA 
G. CCA INFORMATION-SHARING FACTORS 
Each of the four information-sharing options (current fire service, FSIE, FDNY 
Strategy, and CCA) examined for this thesis is qualitatively evaluated and then 
graphically represented by an information-sharing matrix based on five factors. The five 
factors are legal compliance, political acceptability, target capabilities linkage, 
operational impact, and cost.  
1. Legal Compliance 
The common law process used to adopt the CCA in the UK does not appear to be 
substantially different from the adoption of many post-9/11 homeland security–related 
U.S. guidelines, policies, strategies, presidential directives, and public laws relating to 
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counterterrorism information sharing.115 The difference is that the U.S. has chosen not to 
explicitly require information sharing between the fire service and the homeland security 
community, while England has. In both countries national crises occurred that 
necessitated change to lessen or eliminate future man-made and natural disasters. The 
United States and the United Kingdom both analyzed the issues, sought input from the 
major stakeholders, developed wide-ranging policies, strategies, and laws, and instituted 
measures in an effort to lessen or eliminate future catastrophic events.  
The result for the U.S. fire service has been an informal information-sharing 
environment that is non-mandatory, casual and limited in structure and scope. In England 
the CCA requires fire brigades to participate (and to lead, in the case of London) in the 
Local Resilience Forums and to share information informally and formally. The majority 
of the fifty-seven regulations in Part One of the CCA significantly enhance the 
 
115 Bush, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Guidelines and 
Requirements in Support of the Information Sharing Environment. “Ensuring the appropriate access to, and 
the sharing, integration, and use of, information by Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies with 
counterterrorism responsibilities, and, as appropriate, private sector entities, while protecting the 
information privacy and other legal rights of Americans, remains a high priority for the United States and a 
necessity for winning the war on terror. Consistent with section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108 458) (IRTPA), my Administration is working to create 
an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to facilitate the sharing of terrorism information (as defined in 
Executive Order 13388 of October 25, 2005). Section 1016 of IRTPA supplements section 892 of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107 296), Executive Order 13311 of July 29, 2003, and other 
Presidential guidance, which address various aspects of information access. On April 15, 2005, consistent 
with section 1016(f) of IRTPA, I designated the program manager (PM) responsible for information 
sharing across the Federal Government. On June 2, 2005, my memorandum entitled “Strengthening 
Information Sharing, Access, and Integration - Organizational, Management, and Policy Development 
Structures for Creating the Terrorism Information Sharing Environment” directed that the PM and his 
office be part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and that the DNI exercise 
authority, direction, and control over the PM and ensure that the PM carries out his responsibilities under 
IRTPA. On October 25, 2005, I issued Executive Order 13388 to facilitate the work of the PM and the 
expeditious establishment of the ISE and restructure the Information Sharing Council (ISC), which 
provides advice concerning and assists in the establishment, implementation, and maintenance of the ISE. 
On June 2, 2005, I also established the Information Sharing Policy Coordination Committee (ISPCC), 
which is chaired jointly by the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and the National Security Council 
(NSC), and which has the responsibilities set forth in section D of Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 1 and other relevant presidential guidance with respect to information sharing. The ISPCC is the 
main day-to-day forum for interagency coordination of information sharing policy, including the resolution 
of issues raised by the PM, and provides policy analysis and recommendations for consideration by the 
more senior committees of the HSC and NSC systems and ensures timely responses. Section 1016(d) of 
IRTPA calls for leveraging all ongoing efforts consistent with establishing the ISE, the issuance of 
guidelines for acquiring, accessing, sharing, and using information in support of the ISE and for protecting 
privacy and civil liberties in the development of the ISE, and the promotion of a culture of information 
sharing. Consistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 103 of the 





                                                
probability of informal and formal information sharing with England’s fire service. In the 
United States DHS funding—primarily in the form of grants to fusion centers and other 
information-sharing enterprises—has been the catalyst for fire service information 
sharing related to terrorism. Also in the United States most firefighters do not know what 
terrorism indicators to look for, when to look for them, or how to share the information.  
2. Political Acceptability 
At the U.S. national level, the political acceptability of the fire service 
information sharing (compared to the CCA model that requires cooperation among the 
homeland security and intelligence communities) is practically non-existent and therefore 
unknown. From a U.S. fire service perspective the CCA categorization of emergency 
services such as police, fire, emergency medical, and coastguard agencies into “Level 1 
or Core Responders” could occur within the U.S. system with a modification to the 
National Strategy for Information Sharing.116 Requiring Core Responders to interact with 
Cooperating Responders through the Local Resilience Forums and requiring the 
Responder-based forums to develop and publish Risk Registers significantly enhances the 
probability of information sharing in the prevention or disruption of terrorism. 117 Similar 
models may have application in the United States. 
In the United States from 2002 through 2005, President Bush attempted to ensure 
“the appropriate access to, and the sharing, integration, and use of, information by 
Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities, and, as 
appropriate, private sector entities, while protecting the information privacy and other 
legal rights of Americans,” through the authorization of numerous strategies, processes, 
 
116 White House, National Security Council, National Strategy for Information Sharing, 17.  
117 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 
Short Guide, Annex A. Category 2 or cooperating responders include the following disciplines: electricity 
distributors and transmitters, gas distributors, water and sewerage undertakers, telephone service providers 
(fixed and mobile), network rail, train operating companies (passenger and freight), London Underground, 
transport for London, airport operators, harbour authorities, highways agency, strategic health authorities, 
and health and safety executive. 
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28 through 35.122  
                                                
and systems to facilitate the sharing of terrorist related information.118 The CCA is 
probably a less complex and more efficient method of enhancing terrorism prevention 
and preparation through collaboration and information sharing within government 
agencies and of incorporating public and private-sector partners into the process. Many of 
the U.S. enterprises are beginning to mature, and the U.S. fire service appears to be an 
ancillary partner, especially at the state and local levels including fusion centers.  
3. Target Capabilities Linkage  
Of the four target capabilities selected for this project, England’s current fire 
service role addressed three of the four target capabilities fully and the CBRNE capability 
partially. Intelligence/information sharing and dissemination U.S. DHS target capability 
issues applicable to CCA Part One regulations were found in regulations 18, 45-53.119 
Relating to CBRNE detection, the CCA did not address detection issues specifically but 
did refer to radiological planning and public information in Regulation 12.120 
Regulations similar to the information gathering and recognition of indicators target 
capabilities were identified in regulations 11, 15, 33.121 Regulations that had applicability
to the warnings, intelligence analysis, and production target capabilities were found in 
regulations 20 and 
4. Operational Impact 
In England the 2006 National Capability Survey suggested that local responders 
have made good progress in effectively implementing the Civil Contingencies Act.123 
Regarding cooperation and information sharing the survey indicated, “The vast majority 
 
118 Bush, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Guidelines and 
Requirements in Support of the Information Sharing Environment. 
119 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 
Part 1 Local Arrangements for Civil Protection. Regulation 18: Provision of information relating to 
assessment of risk to other responders; Regulation 32: Identification of Category 1 responder with lead 
responsibility for warning, informing and advising; Regulations 45-53. 
120 Ibid., Regulation 12, Existing emergency planning duties. 
121 Ibid.  
122 Ibid. 
123 United Kingdom Resilience, Emergency Preparedness, Progress on Implementation of the Civil 





                                                
of Local Resilience Forums and supporting task groups are up and running and 
functioning effectively. Almost all local responders are happy that Local Resilience 
Forums are providing the right level of engagement to enable members to perform the 
tasks mandated by the Act.”124 Conversely, there has been discussion among NPS 
cohorts 0705 and 0706 that, while the Local Resilience Forums appear to have well-
organized and robust planning components, some British fire chiefs indicated to NPS 
cohort participants that the forums are dominated by the law enforcement representatives, 
and in reality there is a lack of true collaborative planning and preparation. In addition 
there may be limited training and exercising coordinated by these councils, which leads 
to operational disconnects. Like many plans and programs in the U.S. homeland security 
community, the CCA concepts and plans may appear to be effective, but the practical 
application to current operations may not be adequate. 
5. Costs 
A review of available literature indicates that the CCA not been audited for cost in 
England. Scotland is auditing its version of the CCA, but the results will not be available 
until sometime in 2009. It appears that the costs of implementation of the CCA were 
primarily soft labor costs and were incorporated into the current budgets for the 
organizations participating. 
H. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Review of the CCA Part One regulations and related guidance documents and a 
comparison with literature reviewed for this thesis reveals one difference between the 
U.S. and England’s fire service information-sharing environment: England’s fire service 
information sharing is mandated and consolidated primarily in one document, the CCA. 
Under the Civil Contingencies Act, Level 1 (core) and Level 2 (cooperating) responders 
are mandated to share information with other Level 1 and 2 responders.125 The sharing of 
 
124 United Kingdom Resilience, Emergency Preparedness, Progress on Implementation of the Civil 
Contingencies Act. 
125 United Kingdom, HM Government Emergency Preparedness, 24.  
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informal and formal information is recognized as being good practice as well as a critical 
element of preventing man-made or natural disasters.126 
The U.S. fire service has a history of more than two hundred years of successfully 
reducing unwanted fires by leading collaborative prevention-oriented risk assessments 
and pre-planning processes based on open-source informal and formal information 
sharing. Building on the U.S. fire service history of fire prevention, incorporating the 
CCA information-sharing requirements (in which England’s fire departments play a role) 
may increase information sharing among U.S. homeland security partners.  
The current National Strategy for Information Sharing (NSIS) “Sharing 
Information with State, Local and Tribal Governments” section should be modified to 
include the language shown below (extrapolated from the CCA Part One Regulations 55-
57, “Role of London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority”). A new open-source 
information-sharing plan led by local fire departments may improve formal and informal 
information sharing between the U.S. fire service and other homeland security partners 
and may potentially prevent or disrupt terrorism.  
Current NSIS Language: 
To implement recommendations developed pursuant to Guideline 2 of the 
President’s Guidelines, and as key participants in the information-sharing 
mission, State, local, and tribal entities are encouraged to undertake the 
following activities, in appropriate consultation and coordination with 
Federal departments and agencies.127 
Recommended Language: 
A.  Role of local or regional fire service authority 
In communities with established fire service, it shall be the responsibility 
of fire chief of the fire service to: 
(1) Ensure that a collaborative open-source information-sharing plan is 
created and maintained. The fire chief shall be responsible for ensuring 
that all agencies, public and private, associated with the area homeland 
security, emergency services, and critical infrastructure sectors identified 
in the National Response Framework participate. The information-sharing 
 
126 United Kingdom, HM Government Emergency Preparedness, 24. 





                                                
plan will include informal and formal information-sharing systems or 
processes associated with potential man-made or natural disasters, 
including terrorist attacks for the pre-defined area, urban area, state 
homeland security region, or other mutually accepted area(s). 
 
(2) On behalf of all relevant homeland security, emergency services, and 
critical infrastructure sector participants who have functions that are 
exercisable in the identified area, the fire department will be the authority 
having jurisdiction and will take the lead responsibility for exercising the 
information-sharing plan in relation to area-wide emergencies in 
accordance with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation 
Program;128 and 
 
(3) At the request of relevant homeland security, emergency services, or 
critical infrastructure sector partners who have functions that are 
exercisable in the area, assist sector and private partners in – 
(i) carrying out exercises for the purpose of ensuring that the 
information-sharing plan maintained by that relevant sector or 
partner is appropriate for the risk(s); 
 
(ii) the inter-sector training of responders or other persons for the 
purposes of ensuring that the plan is actionable and effective.129 
B.  Role of other homeland security, emergency services, and critical 
infrastructure sector partners 
 
Homeland security, emergency services, and critical infrastructure sector 
partners who have functions that are exercisable in the pre-determined 
area, shall cooperate with the fire service authority having jurisdiction in 








                                                
I. CONCLUSION 
The CCA encourages informal information sharing over required or formal 
information sharing based on the presumption that information should be shared, but the 
release of some information—and of information to some audiences—should be 
controlled.130 
It is the responsibility of Level 1 and 2 responders to understand what should be 
controlled and how to categorize the various types of information; how the different types 
of information can be used; how to obtain consent from other homeland security partners; 
and the limits on disclosure of information.131 
On the other hand, in the United States, information sharing is not required by the 
various homeland security grant programs available to America’s core responders. The 
net result is that less information is shared in the United States, which increases the risk 
of successful terrorist attacks. Also, as a consumer of potential terrorist information, the 
lack of information sharing with the U.S. fire service inhibits optimum preparation and 
response capabilities as well as citizen and firefighter safety. 
 
130 United Kingdom, HM Government Emergency Preparedness, 24–33. 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, 
or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction 
of a new order of things. 
— Niccolò Machiavelli132 
 
The fundamental qualitative premise underlying this thesis is that there are 
lessons to be learned by the U.S. fire service from existing international, national, and 
local information-sharing partnerships. This chapter consolidates and analyzes the value 
of contemporary smart practices. 
Based on the findings of this thesis, U.S. fire personnel could serve as both 
collectors and consumers of information during the prevention, protection, response and 
recovery missions. They may also assist the information-sharing community through 
uniform communication of standardized potential terrorist indicators encountered during 
their normal operations (emergency and non-emergency).  
Much like fire brigades in England, U.S. fire departments can use information to 
evaluate the likelihood of a threat, bring diversified organizations together, and pre-plan a 
response in the event of an attack. Following an attack, fire marshals may be capable of 
classifying and distributing vital information to other first responders and other homeland 
security agencies. Fire marshals may also be a good resource in post-incident 
investigations leading to arrests, as exemplified in the following case synopsis. 
In 2006, a group of Phoenix, Arizona metro-area fire marshals cooperated with 
the Phoenix Joint Terrorism Task Force in the investigation of an ecoterrorist who set fire 




133 Churay, Assistant Special Agent in charge of the FBI’s Phoenix division, testimony to House 
Committee on Governmental Reform, Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management 





A. ANALYSIS CRITERIA 
 Using the qualitative criteria identified below, consideration was given to local, 
national and international smart practices, gaps and potential blind spots applicable to the 
U.S. fire service information-sharing environment. The criteria used to compare and 
contrast the current fire service information sharing with the FDNY Strategy and FSIE 
and the CCA are listed in Chapter I. 
B. CURRENT U.S. FIRE SERVICE, FDNY, FSIE AND CCA 

















Low/Average Average Low Unacceptable Low 
FDNY 
Strategy 
High High High Average  Average
FSIE High Unknown Good Unknown Average
CCA Unknown Good Average Good High 
Figure 9.   Information-Sharing Matrix 
The following matrices and information-sharing criteria discussions are organized 
from highest to lowest for each measure. For example, the matrix for legal compliance is 
ordered beginning with the FDNY, FSIE, current U.S. fire service, and finally the CCA. 
1. Legal Compliance 
Information-Sharing Option Legal Compliance 
FDNY Strategy  High  
FSIE  High 
Current U.S. Fire Service Low/Average 
CCA Unknown 
Figure 10.   Legal Compliance 
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The FDNY Strategy received the highest value due to the use of accepted local, 
state, and federal strategies, laws, and guidelines. (At the time of this writing, the FDNY 
Strategy was the only completed U.S. fire service information-sharing document that had 
received and passed a legal review.)  
According to Townsend, “The FSIE is being designed in compliance with all 
Federal laws and will be reviewed by DHS Privacy, Civil Rights/Civil Liberties, 
Security, and DHS OGC, as well as the DOJ Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative. We are also adhering to all criminal intelligence laws, when applicable.”134 
Based on my review of the current FSIE documents and Townsend’s previous work with 
the FDNY Strategy, I anticipate that the finished FSIE products will meet or exceed the 
established legal requirements.  
The legality of the current information-sharing environment is questionable, since 
most firefighters do not know what terrorism indicators to look for, when to look for 
them, or how to report them. Given that most firefighters are not actively aware of or 
engaged in reporting potential terrorist indicators, the fire service has not created any 
significant legal exposure or civil liberties violations. Based on Masse’s findings, the fire 
service has a legal responsibility to report suspicious activity.135 
The CCA information collection and sharing structure was based on the United 
Kingdom’s system of government and did not address the legality of information 
collection. The CCA exceeded the three other options relating to legal information 
sharing of open-source, sensitive, and classified information between the core and 
cooperating responders.  
 
134 Townsend, personal communication with author, December 16, 2008. 





2. Political Acceptability 
Information-Sharing Option Political Acceptability 
FDNY Strategy  High  
CCA Good 
Current U.S. Fire Service Average 
FSIE Unknown 
 
Figure 11.   Political Acceptability 
The FDNY Strategy incorporates FDNY policy–level fire officers who use the 
requirements and guidelines of numerous accepted local, state, and federal documents. 
The CCA may be the most politically comprehensive single-source fire service 
information-sharing document analyzed for this thesis. As stated earlier, in the October 
2007 U.S. National Information Sharing Strategy,136 the U.S. fire service is not identified 
anywhere in the forty-page document.137 In England’s CCA, the fire service roles and 
responsibilities regarding information sharing are clearly defined at the national, regional, 
and local levels, and in the case of the London fire brigade, the fire service is mandated to 
take a lead role. 
Applicability of the current fire service information-sharing environment to the 
U.S. public, policy groups, labor unions, governmental agencies, and other related 
organizations is in the early stages of development. At the national level, Department of 
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff advocated for the inclusion of firefighters 
in state and local fusion centers.138 
The December 2008 draft of the FSIE CONPLAN analyzed in Chapter III appears 
to be a more practical and robust direction for the U.S. fire service.  
                                                 
136 White House, National Security Council, National Strategy for Information Sharing, 17. 
137 Ibid.  
138 Chertoff , remarks at the International Association of Fire Chiefs, October 26, 2007. 
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3. Target Capabilities List Linkage 
Information-Sharing Option Target Capabilities List Linkage 
FDNY Strategy  High  
FSIE Good 
CCA Average 
Current U.S. Fire Service Low 
Figure 12.   Target Capabilities List Linkage 
The FDNY used the fifteen planning scenarios to enhance their protection and 
response missions and to compete for DHS grant funding. The FDNY Strategy exceeded 
the four information-sharing target capabilities criteria by identifying the role of the 
FDNY in all thirty-six target capabilities identified in the National Preparedness 
Guidelines. 
The current FSIE CONPLAN does not specifically address target capabilities. 
The FSIE is given a “Good” rating based on information received from the DHS I&A 
State and Local Program Office that indicated national planning scenarios, attack 
timelines, and universal adversary profiles are being used to guide the 
information/intelligence requirements identification, and the target capabilities list is 
being used to guide the mechanisms of identification, technical assistance, and 
training.”139 
Of the four information-sharing target capabilities selected for this project, the 
CCA addresses three of the four target capabilities fully and the CBRNE capability 
partially. 
Of the four information-sharing target capabilities selected for this project, the 
current fire service role in the homeland security information-sharing environment 
formally utilized only the CBRNE detection target capabilities component through the 
DHS FY 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) Program.  
                                                 





4. Operational Impact 
Information-Sharing Option Operational Impact 
CCA  Good  
FDNY Strategy Average  
FSIE Low 
Current U.S. Fire Service Unacceptable 
Figure 13.   Operational Impact 
In England, the 2006 National Capability Survey suggested that local responders 
have made good progress in enhancing the operational information-sharing impact of the 
Civil Contingencies Act.140 “The vast majority of Local Resilience Forums and 
supporting task groups are up and running and functioning effectively. Almost all local 
responders are happy that Local Resilience Forums are providing the right level of 
engagement to enable members to perform the tasks mandated by the Act.”141   
The FDNY Strategy may have relevance for increasing the U.S. fire service 
operational impact in the all-hazards information-sharing environment. For example, the 
FDNY Bureau of Investigation maintains numerous important connections with the 
homeland security community; they are implementing a network-centric information-
sharing–based command system that has the potential to significantly increase real-time 
information sharing among a myriad of local, state, and federal partners; and they 
communicate national and local information to tens of thousands of fire personal and 
homeland security partners through Watchline.  
The FSIE CONPLAN contains specific accountability components for the 
management of the information-sharing tasks. If the current information-sharing gap is 
                                                 
140 United Kingdom Resilience, Emergency Preparedness, Progress on Implementation of the Civil 
Contingencies Act.  
141 Ibid. 
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the catalyst for increased information sharing with the homeland security community, 
then the current FSIE CONPLAN\ is moving towards enhancing the operational impact. 
The operational impact of the current information-sharing environment was 
difficult to quantify. The anecdotal successes associated with information sharing among 
homeland security and the fire service, combined with the recent emergence of strategies 
and technical assistance programs, suggests that there is a heightened awareness of the 
potential for firefighters as sensors of opportunity that identify potential terrorist 
activities and as consumers of information for specific terrorist targets. Considering that 
we are at war on two fronts and that domestic and international terrorists have sworn 
cripple the United States through terrorism, the current organized information sharing 
between the fire service and homeland security community is unacceptable. 
5. Costs 
Information-Sharing Option Costs 
Current U.S. Fire Service Low 
FDNY Strategy Average 
FSIE Average 
CCA Average 
Figure 14.   Costs 
The United States spends approximately $100 billion per year on homeland 
security.142 Homeland security expenses include federal, state, and local law 
enforcement, emergency medical, public works, and fire services.143 Generally speaking, 
information regarding the national effort to enhance homeland security through 
information sharing with the fire service was not available but may involve some 
relatively small fiscal costs. Most costs appeared to be absorbed by current fire and 
intelligence personnel responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
information. 
                                                 






The cost of developing and implementing the FDNY Strategy appears to have 
been incorporated into the operating budget and supplemented with DHS grant funding 
for equipment. For example, the cost of producing and distributing Watchline as well as 
the Network-Centric Command System appear to have been developed within the 
FDNY’s FY 06-07 operating budget. 
Data identifying costs were not available in the FSIE CONPLAN. Based on 
information within the CONPLAN framework, requirements, mechanisms, technical 
assistance and training, the costs may be reasonable considering the DHS budget. 
A review of available literature indicated that the CCA not been audited for cost 
in England. Scotland is auditing their version of the CCA, but the results will not be 
available until sometime in 2009. The costs of implementation of the CCA may have 
been primarily soft costs incorporated into the current budgets for the public and private 
organizations that participated. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations considered existing programs, political 
considerations, and financial constraints associated with the four information-sharing 
options. 
1. Current Fire Service Information-Sharing and FSIE 
Recommendations 
Despite all our collective homeland security efforts since 9/11, it appears that the 
only homeland security partners with established access to information are those with law 
enforcement connections. If the fire service is to increase its use of all-hazards 
information in its decision cycles, then homeland security information-sharing partners 
may wish to open up the information-sharing system both culturally and politically. The 
best intelligence should be provided to the widest group of decision-makers, including 
(perhaps especially) those with no historical information-sharing relationships.  
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The four indicators listed below (as discussed in Chapter III) were common in the 
more than one hundred fifty current homeland security terrorist-related indicators studied. 
The four common terrorist indicators could be printed on business cards with contact 
information of the local information-sharing partner (fire marshal, law enforcement, 
JTTF, fusion center) on the other side of the card. The cards could then be distributed 
through the representative organizations such as the International Association of 
Firefighters, International Association of Fire Chiefs and the National Volunteer Fire 
Council. 
1. Suspicious Behavior - Especially unusual nervousness for the situation 
and inappropriate or lack of eye contact.  
2. Unusual supplies for occupancy type (structure or vehicle) - 
Especially storing large amounts of chemicals, cash, electronics. 
3. Unusual documents for the occupancy type - Especially maps, books, 
blueprints, literature… of critical infrastructures.  
4. Intelligence gathering - Especially surveillance, taking pictures, video, 
notes, asking questions, attempting to gain access. 
A second recommendation is to use local fire marshals as planning-and-logistics 
officers, specifically for fire personnel (and their families) during extended all-hazards 
responses lasting longer than two operational periods or twenty-four hours. This will 
enhance information sharing between families and response personnel. This 
recommendation may reduce anxiety for fire personnel and their families during high-
profile heavily media-covered events. 
Regarding the FSIE, the FSIE CONPLAN recommendation—of a national 
network of fire service and homeland security organizations that share all-hazard 
information and intelligence in a collaborative effort to enhance the national prevention, 
preparation, response, and recovery missions—should be implemented. The FSIE should 
also continue to work within the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative to ensure 
that fire service fusion center liaisons (or representatives) act as nodes and that the fusion 
centers (UASI and state) act as hubs for receiving and disseminating relevant information 





                                                
A final FSIE significant information-sharing recommendation is to increase the 
current level of information sharing across the fire service through social networking. At 
the time of this writing, the DHS I&A is designing a homeland security information 
network portal for fire service–wide dissemination of all locally and federally generated 
information and intelligence products that relate to the fire and emergency services.144 If 
the portal is user-friendly and the information is concise, informative, and pertinent to 
current fire service all-hazards missions, many fire personnel will use the information to 
augment their prevention, preparation, and response activities.145  
2. FDNY Strategy Recommendations 
Many of the strategies and tactics that FDNY developed for responding to, 
mitigating, and preventing all-hazard disasters can be leveraged by other emergency 
services sectors, especially the fire services. The FDNY’s fifteen thousand fire personnel 
responded to over four hundred thousand emergencies and conducted more than one 
hundred sixty thousand building inspections in 2007.146 This volume of activity and 
resources allowed the FDNY to develop strategic approaches and operational activities in 
preparation, prevention, and response to all hazards.147 The FDNY Strategy identified 
numerous ways in which firefighters can produce and consume practical preparedness 
and response information. Increased synchronization and communication with the 
homeland security community is one tactic that may enhance the FDNY’s and other U.S. 
fire departments’ ability to fulfill their core missions of saving lives and property. A 
number of the following FDNY strategic objectives may have application to small and 
large fire departments across the United States. 
One strategic objective involves the use of fire marshals as homeland security 
liaison officers with homeland security partners such as the JTTF, TWIG, FBI, or fusion 
 
144 Townsend, personal communication with author, December 16, 2008. 
145 Fire Department City of New York, “Terrorism,” 19.  
146 Fire Department City of New York, Vital Statistics. 2008. 
147 Fire Department City of New York, “Terrorism,” 21. 
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centers. The fire marshals/security liaison officers would share information in preparation 
for generalized or non-specific terrorism threats and participate in the investigation of fire 
or explosion-related terrorism incidents. Fire marshals may be useful at potential terrorist 
emergency scenes to ensure the safety of workers relating to secondary devices and scene 
control.  
The evolution of FDNY’s integrated all-hazards Incident Command System–
based information-sharing system for all multi-discipline, multi-agency emergency 
responses and high-profile or target-rich special events may enhance the current national 
incident management system currently required by the DHS. 
If successful in NYC, consider incorporating the FDNY Network-Centric 
Command System into the national incident management system for use throughout the 
U.S. fire service to enhance real-time information sharing among multi-disciplinary 
operations within a large-scale command. Another recommendation—prompted by the 
idea of FDNY’s Network-Centric Command System—is to enhance information 
collection and sharing through the use of a diverse suite of small unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance and possibly intervention operations. The Naval War 
College’s Global Hawk or a similar system might be leveraged by the fire service and 
homeland security partners for real-time information sharing during pre-planning, 
response, and recovery missions on large scale, natural or man-made disasters. 
 Finally, with permission of the FDNY and working in conjunction with the 
DHS/FEMA Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing Analysis 
Center, modify and expand the distribution of the FDNY Watchline for distribution to the 
U.S. fire service. A national Watchline-type program could be coordinated and managed 
through U.S. Fire Administration. Using the fusion centers as venues for a Watchline-
type product might enhance relationship building between the fire service and the 
intelligence community working in the state and regional fusion centers.  
3. CCA Recommendations 
The primary recommendation derived from the CCA for this thesis was the 





Information with State, Local and Tribal Governments” section to include language 
extrapolated from the CCA Part One Regulations 55-57, “Role of London Fire and 
Emergency Planning Authority.” Modification of the NSIS may enhance information 
sharing through the establishment of formalized local and regional networks similar to 
those found in England. Unlike England, U.S. information sharing is currently not 
required among America’s core responders, which may increase the risk of terrorist 
attacks in the United States. Also, as a consumer of potential terrorist information, the 
lack of information sharing inhibits optimum preparation and response by the U.S. Fire 
Service. The recommended language for the NSIS is located in Chapter V. 
Other recommendations derived from the CCA involve the development of 
national U.S. guidance templates for formally requesting information after the CCA 
three-step informal information-sharing process is not successful. When instances of 
formalized information sharing might be necessary between the U.S. fire service and its 
homeland security partners, templates similar to those in Chapter V, Figures 5, 6, and 7 
might be useful. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The international, national, and local smart practices consolidated in this chapter 
may provide the catalyst for increased systematic, operational, and legal information 
sharing between the fire service and homeland security partners. Chapter VII discusses 
strategic planning to enhance information sharing through such practices as those 
recommended in this thesis between the U.S. fire service and the homeland security 
information-sharing community. 
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VII. STRATEGIC PLANNING TO IMPROVE INFORMATION-
SHARING BETWEEN THE FIRE SERVICE AND HOMELAND 
SECURITY COMMUNITY 
 
There is nothing permanent except change. 
—Heraclitus of Greece148 
A. WHY STRATEGIC PLANNING? 
Fire service/homeland security information-sharing strategic planning is about 
leading change through the creation of a roadmap to the preferred information-sharing 
future. Whether relying on the formal concepts, tools, and procedures such as those in the 
Blue Ocean Strategy and Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations to 
get to the preferred future, or using more organically oriented approaches such as those 
identified in The Starfish and the Spider, the results of successful strategic planning are 
fundamentally based on three leader-orchestrated components.149 In effective strategic 
planning the leader should:  
1. Have the capacity to develop and mobilize stakeholders around a shared 
vision, 
 
2. Ensure effective translation of the vision into concrete outcomes, and  
 
3. Demonstrate a commitment to integrity and ethics through the practice of 
accountability.150  
 
As Bryson indicated, “There is no substitute for leadership.”151 My experience of 
twenty-seven years in the fire service demonstrates that having the right type of leader(s) 
 
148 Heraclitus, http://www.toinspire.com/author.asp?author=Heraclitus+of+Greece. Reportedly an 
observation made by Heraclitus of Greece in 513 B.C. 
149 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy; Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit 
Organizations”; Brafman and Ceckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider. 
150 World Bank Institute, Background Notes on Leadership. 





                                                
to lead and manage organizational change (in this case, U.S. fire service and homeland 
security information-sharing) is critical to preventing future terrorism.  
Another important component is systematically identifying the gap(s) between 
where an organization is and where it should be. Having identified the gaps, the next step 
is developing the road map to get the organization where it needs to be. Fundamentally, 
the strategic-planning process is really about figuring out where you are, where you want 
to be, and how you will get there – a bit like planning a career, a vacation, or any voyage 
to a new destination.152  
While many cultural, financial, environmental, and process factors must align to 
increase information sharing between the fire service and the homeland security 
community, the strategic-planning tipping-point is the point at which dissatisfaction with 
the current information-sharing environment is greater than moving toward a new or 
different destination. Many times it is a real or perceived crisis that creates the tipping 
point and corporate desire to reach a strategic goal. In the case of sharing information 
with non-traditional intelligence partners, the tipping point may have been 9/11. The 9/11 
Commission reported on the failure of the intelligence community to “connect the dots” 
that may have prevented the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.153 Could the fire 
service have assisted in “connecting the dots”? Could the consequences of continued 
ambiguity related to one million fire personnel collecting, disseminating, and receiving 
potential terrorist-related “dots” result in future catastrophic loss of life to our citizens 
and firefighters? We may never know the answers to those questions, but with increased 
information sharing will come the increased potential for terrorism prevention or 
mitigation. As exemplified in this thesis, the development of new strategies or roadmaps 
for sharing potential terrorism-related information initially, and more recently all-hazards 
information, has assisted the U.S. and England’s fire service in preparing for and 
 
152 Bryson, Strategic Planning, 7. 
153 National Commission, 9/11 Commission Report, 426.  
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 responding to man-made and natural disasters. But successful strategic planning is 
significantly limited without appropriate catalytic leadership as well as the confidence 
and participation of the crowd.154  
A strong strategic-planning team can successfully facilitate the identification of 
gaps and then effectively communicate the needed change. A planning team may use a 
method similar to Bryson’s more traditional Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit 
Organizations.155 Or, in some circumstances a strategic-planning team may facilitate the 
move to a more decentralized flat strategy similar to those used in the development of the 
Internet and Al Qaeda, as exemplified by Ori Brafman, and Rod Ceckstrom in The 
Starfish and The Spider.156 The more traditional approaches are those outlined in 
Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations and the National Fire 
Academy Strategic Management of Change, Change Management Model. (The National 
Fire Academy Model has served me well in leading changes at national, state, and local 
levels.157 The Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations process is also 
similar to the Weidner Planning for Results performance-based strategic-planning and 
budgeting system I have used to facilitate or participate in strategic planning and 
performance-based budgeting.158 )  
The current fire service information-sharing environment represents an informal 
decentralized system similar to those described in The Starfish and The Spider; most fire 
departments are fairly autonomous and experience change independent of other fire 
departments (who can participate in the change or not). For example over eight hundred 
 
154 Bryson, Strategic Planning, 338. The crowd is defined as “stakeholders with little interest or 
power.” In the context of information sharing between the fire service and the homeland security 
community, the crowd is the more than one million U.S. firefighters serving throughout the United States, 
from the most densely populated urban areas to the vast tracks of wild land.  
155 Bryson, Strategic Planning, 327. 
156 Brafman and Ceckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider, 141–142. 
157 The attacks of 9/11 as well as the anthrax incidents were the catalysts for strategic planning. As 
Chairperson of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Technical Committee on Hazardous 
Materials Protective Clothing and Equipment (NFPA 1991 and 1992), I used strategic planning after the 
World Trade Center, Pentagon, and anthrax attacks to lead in the development of a new NFPA Standard 
based on incident specific risk assessments. 
158 Weidner, Planning for Results. In Oklahoma City the name of the system was changed to “Leading 
for Results.” I am one of a cadre of facilitators that assist the twenty-five city departments in strategic 





                                                
thousand of America’s more than one million firefighters are volunteers, and most 
answer to their local policy group. They are loosely affiliated with other fire departments 
around the world through a fundamental ideology or creed based on saving lives and 
protecting property for the greater good.159  
The smart practices recommended in this thesis may provide discussion points for 
increased information sharing between the fire service and homeland security partners 
during the strategic-planning process.  
B. CREATING THE PREFERRED FUTURE 
As discussed, the current state of information sharing between the fire service and 
the homeland security community has considerable gaps that, if not remedied, may result 
in catastrophic loss of life and property. Figure 15 (below) is a “Blue Ocean Strategy”–
based diagnostic tool that compares the current status of information sharing between 
where the fire service and the homeland security community are and where they could be. 
The diagnostic tool also includes indicators to gauge information sharing.160 
In the upper right-hand corner of the diagnostic tool is the strategic application of 
the blue line. The strategic application statements attempt to capture important macro-
level functions for creating comprehensive information-sharing networks between the fire 
service and the homeland security community. The strategic applications used in concert 
with fire service information-sharing power vs. interest grid participants became the 
underpinning upon which the planning process section of this chapter was constructed. 
The lower half of the tool is the strategy canvas. The strategy canvas is both a 
diagnostic and a visual framework for building a compelling strategy to increase 
information sharing. The strategy canvas serves two purposes. First, it graphically 
communicates the current state of activity in the information-sharing environment (red 
line), and second, it shows the potential level of information sharing between the fire 
 
159 National Fire Protection Association, The United States Fire Service, 1; U.S. Fire Administration, 
Fire Departments. 
160 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 25–44. 
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service and the homeland security community (blue line) that is possible, based on the 
findings and recommendations of this thesis. The space between blue and red lines on the 
strategy canvas depicts the gap between the current and recommended future of fire 
service information sharing. The indicators identified on the horizontal axis of the 
strategy canvas list the five measures defined in Chapter I and used throughout this thesis 
to evaluate the current status of fire service information sharing, the FDNY Strategy, and 
the CCA.  
In the upper left-hand corner of the tool (Figure 15) is a two-by-two square that 
identifies four actions that may assist in improving information sharing. The following 
questions were considered in developing the recommended actions identified in the two-
by-two square:161 
1. Which current fire service/HS information-sharing factors should be 
eliminated? 
 
2. Which fire service/HS information-sharing factors should be reduced well 
below the existing environment? 
 
3. Which fire service/HS information-sharing factors should be increased 
well above the existing environment? 
 
4. What new aspects should be created between the fire service and HS 
information-sharing community? 
1. Elimination 
Based on the DHS/U.S. Fire Administration Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise 
Concept Plan (CONPLAN), the CONPLAN may be a venue to consolidate the current ad 
hoc systems and lack of open-source information-sharing through the dissemination of 
intelligence from the intelligence community to state and local fire agencies using state 
and local fusion centers or joint terrorism task forces.162 
 
161 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 29. 
162 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 





                                                
2. Reduction 
Since the FSIE initiative is part of the larger DHS Intelligence and Analysis 
Enterprise, the FSIE could become the point of coordination to reduce the sector-specific 
focus, compartmentalization of information and security-classification challenges. The 
FSIE may further decrease the reduction challenges identified through collaboration with 
the eighteen critical infrastructure/key resource sectors.163 
3. Increase 
The integration, cross-cutting approaches, legal, and operational issues for the fire 
service, law enforcement, ACLU, and others may be increased through the inclusion of 
non-traditional partners into the FSIE project generally and the CONPLAN specifically. 
4. Creation 
The draft CONPLAN recommends specific standardized systems and processes 
for organized and administrated information sharing across the homeland security, fire 
service, and private sectors using state and local fusion centers as nodes. 
 
 
163 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 
Program Office, Draft Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise Concept Plan, Appendix B-4. 
5. Fire Service/Homeland Security Information-Sharing Tool 
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Figure 15.    Fire Service/Homeland Security Information-Sharing Tool 
Figure 16 is a Fire Service Power versus Interest Grid that was designed to help 
identify the key participants for the planning process section of this chapter. The key 
actors are the organizations whose interest and power base must be taken into account in 
order to successfully overcome fire service/homeland security strategic-planning 
challenges.164  
The Fire Service Power versus Interest Grid (Figure 16) arranges fire service 
information-sharing stakeholders in a two-by-two matrix that was based on the Blue Line 
(preferred future) political acceptability and operational impact indicators identified in 
 
164 Bryson, Strategic Planning, 337–340.  
Current Fire Service/HS/Intel Community 
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the strategy canvas (Figure 15). As presented in Chapter I, for the purposes of the Fire 
Service Information-Sharing Power vs. Interest Grid and this thesis: 
1.  “Fire personnel” or “firefighter” includes firefighting, emergency medical 
services, technical rescue, hazardous materials operations, aviation operations, marine 
operations, fire prevention activities, fire inspections, fire investigations, and fire 
communications. 
2. “Homeland Security Information Sharing Community” includes existing and 
emerging federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector organizations affiliated with the 
Department of Homeland Security. 
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Figure 16.   Fire Service Information-Sharing Power vs. Interest Grid 
The players in the Fire Service Information-Sharing Power vs. Interest Grid have 
a fundamental interest in protecting their constituents (fire personnel) from legal and 
operational issues (including death) that may arise from not having a standardized 






                                                
the U.S. fire service. The current homeland security information-sharing community was 
selected as the subjects due to their interest in mitigating future terrorism through 
partnerships with nontraditional intelligence-cycle associates.165 
The DHS Intelligence and Analysis Division was selected as the context setters 
because the DHS Intelligence and Analysis State and Local Section in conjunction with 
the Department of Justice Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative is currently 
working to increase firefighter participation in concert with other critical infrastructure 
and key resource sectors.166 The crowd is the more than one million fire personnel 
/stakeholders serving in over thirty thousand fire departments throughout the United 
States. The crowd currently has little awareness, interest, or power regarding this issue, 
but with the successful implementation of the terrorist indicator cards and data entry into 
the National Fire Information Reporting System in combination with the use of fire 
marshals as homeland security liaison officers, and possibly the implementation of signal 
intelligence recommendations, the crowd’s interest and power should increase.  
Below are initial planning-process recommendations based the consolidation of 
the Fire Service/Homeland Security Information Sharing Tool Blue Line Strategic 
Application (Figure 15) and the Power vs. Interest Grid (Figure 16). 
 
 
165 U.S. Office of Domestic Preparedness, Guidelines for Homeland Security, Prevention and 
Deterrence, 13. The Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) defines the Homeland Security Intelligence 
Cycle as “the process by which information and data is collected, evaluated, stored, analyzed, and then 
produced or placed in some form for dissemination to the intelligence consumer for use. The cycle consists 
of: consumer, collector, evaluation, analysis, production, dissemination, consumption, consumer.” 
According to the ODP the consumer begins and ends the intelligence cycle. To enhance information 
sharing and prevent terrorism, the ODP Guidelines recommend that “all appropriate agencies and 
organizations (Public Health, EMA, EMS, Fire, selected Private Sector, etc.) at all tiers (local, regional, and 
state) receive restricted information on a need-to-know basis, as defined in advance by the task force or 
central authority.” 
166 Bryson, Strategic Planning, 338. For the purposes of the Fire Service Power versus Interest Grid, 
DHS I&A context setters have considerable power but lower levels of direct interest in the outcome than do 
players. As context setters, the DHS I&A State and Local group must be convinced to take a greater 
interest in creating better outcomes for information sharing involving the fire service. In other words, ways 
must be found to move the players (fire service unions) and the context setters as a group higher on the 
interest scale. The obvious way to do this is to figure out how to convince the union leaders and DHS that it 





ty information-sharing future.  
                                                
7. Planning Process 
The following planning process was developed to “enable you and your 
organization to effectively address change by identifying where you want to go, 
determining how to get there, measuring your progress, and recognizing when you’ve 
arrived.”167 Using Bryson’s Strategic Planning For Public and Non-profit 
Organizations, the National Fire Academy’s Change Management Model (and my 
experiences in leading and facilitating change), this planning process should allow a 
guiding coalition to analyze potential merger(s), anticipate information challenges, and 
reduce their negative effects. In essence, this is the beginning of a road map that can be 
used to create the preferred fire service/homeland securi
John Kotter has indicated that one component of unsuccessful change 
management is “not creating a powerful enough guiding coalition.”168 Kotter proposes 
that many organizational changes fail because organizations underestimate the difficulties 
of producing an effective guiding coalition. Sometimes they have no history of teamwork 
at the top and therefore undervalue the importance of this type of coalition. Sometimes 
they expect the team to be led by a staff manager instead of a key line manager. No 
matter how capable or dedicated the staff head, groups without strong line leadership 
rarely achieve the power that is required to institute change.169  
The creation of a fire service/homeland security information-sharing guiding 
coalition170 will allow players, subjects, and context setters to qualify and quantify the 
value of increased formalized information-sharing environments at the local, state, and 
national levels. I suggest that two important components of the guiding coalition are 
necessary. One is broad representation of all stakeholders (players, subjects and context 
setters), and the other is a fundamental focus on doing what is best for the citizens. 
 
167 U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Fire Administration, National Fire Academy, 
Change Management Model, 2. 
168 Kotter, “Leading Change,” 1–11.  
169 Ibid. 
170 U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Fire Administration, National Fire Academy, 
Change Management Model, 2–7. 
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Examples of representation may include interested citizens, union representatives, elected 
officials, law enforcement, ACLU, NFPA, fusion centers, emergency services and critical 
infrastructure/key resources representatives, business, law enforcement, fire service, and 
others who have a stake in information sharing to prevent or disrupt terrorism.  
The planning process should allow the guiding coalition to evaluate the pros and 
cons of organizational conditions, potential destabilizing forces, and the impact of 
potential information sharing to the fire service and homeland security community. The 
analysis phase may help the guiding coalition in determining necessary information-
sharing change requirements and reveal when information sharing is not in the best 
interest of the citizens (the ultimate customer). The specific tasks and steps listed below 
can and should be modified as appropriate by the guiding coalition.  
Leadership commitment from context setters and players identified in the Fire 
Service Information-Sharing Power vs. Interest Grid (Figure 16) is critical. Executive 
leadership of the context setters and players may or may not participate in the guiding 
coalition discussed in the planning process below, but they must demonstrate 
commitment and invest their time in the process. Regarding the importance of leadership 
commitment during change, Gene Hall, Jim Rosenthal, and Judy Wade wrote, “A 
reengineering project will fail without the full commitment of senior executives.”171 
Hall, Rosenthal and Wade went on to say that successful change managers make a
compromises and are generous with resources. Most important, the executives invest 
their own time in the project. Top executives spend between 20% and 60% of their time 
on the project. At less successful companies, the leadership has nominal sponsorship of 
someone two to four layers down in the organization. The ultimate change ends up 
focusing on issues that never go anywhere.172 With Hall’s statement in mind, it is 
important for players and context setters to make a significant, possibly written 
commitment, to the information-sharing process below. 
 






                                                
8. Guiding Coalition 
The guiding coalition may consist of representatives from fire service and 
homeland security players and context setters identified in the power vs. interest grid. 
The participants should be powerful in terms of information, expertise, reputations, and 
relationships. Guiding coalition participants might include representatives from the 
following homeland security information-sharing community: DOJ Global Justice 
Information Sharing Initiative (Global), the State, Local, and Tribal Integration Working 
Group (SLTIWG), the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC), the National 
Fusion Center Coordination Group (NFCCG) and the Senior Level Interagency Advisory 
Group (SLIAG).173 
C. DETERMINE WHERE WE ARE 
The first objective is to conduct an overall needs assessment to get a sense of the 
scale of the current information-sharing environment, or as Bryson indicated in the “A” 
phase of the “ABCs of Strategic Planning,” “figuring out where you are.”174  
1. The first task is to assess the existing information-sharing environment within the 
fire service to determine whether the fire service should participate in the 
homeland security information-sharing effort, and if so how much participation is 
appropriate based on the needs and expectations of the citizens. This is achieved 
by evaluating the current conditions within the fire service as identified in the red 
line of the strategy canvas (Figure 14) and the current fire service option of the 
information-sharing matrix (Figure 1). 
1.1. Evaluate fire service information-sharing adherence to national, state, and 
departmental laws and national consensus standards. 
 
1.2. Interview or survey selected departments from the crowd on how 
information-sharing decisions are made.  
 
 
173 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 
Program Office, Draft Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise Concept Plan. 
174 Bryson, Strategic Planning, 6. 
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1.2.1. May wish to use FSIE federal/national, or state/local 
representatives.175 
 
1.3. Interview or survey selected departments from the crowd on how often legal, 
moral, and ethical standards guide their information-sharing decision-making 
process.  
 
1.3.1. May wish to use federal/national or state/local representatives, 
including FSIE working group departments. 
 
1.4. Interview or survey selected departments from the crowd on overall morale 
of their departments. 
 
1.4.1. May wish to use federal/national or state/local representatives, 
including FSIE working group departments. 
 
1.5. Solicit input on how fire service–wide changes take place. 
1.6. The guiding coalition identifies how recent fire service–wide changes have 
occurred.  
 
1.7. Other indicators that may affect information-sharing changes. 
1.7.1. Impact of historical fire service mission, value, and norms relating 
to fire personnel saving lives and property without collecting potential 
terrorist information. 
 
1.7.2. Determine, define and comply with national, state, and local 
values. 
D. IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL DESTABILIZING FORCES 
2. After identifying and comparing current fire service information-sharing 
conditions, the second task is to identify and forecast potential destabilizing forces 
external to the fire service that may have an effect on information sharing. This 
task focuses primarily on forces originating outside the fire service, but not 
necessarily outside the influence of the crowd, subjects, players, or context 
setters, and compares the external forces to information-sharing benchmarks 
 
175 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 





                                                
identified in the information-sharing outcome matrix (Figure 11), the strategy 
canvas blue line (Figure 15), and the draft FSIE CONPLAN.  
2.1. Identify technological factors, including the recommendations identified in 
this thesis. 
 
2.2. Identify influential economic factors. 
2.3. Identify influential social factors. 
2.4. Identify relevant political/legal factors, including the recommendations 
identified in this thesis. 
 
2.5. Survey or interview. 
2.5.1. Citizens on fire service information-sharing expectations. 
2.5.2. Players on fire service information-sharing expectations. 
2.5.3. Context setters on fire service information-sharing expectations. 
2.5.4. Subjects on fire service information-sharing expectations. 
2.5.5. The crowd on fire service information-sharing expectations. 
2.5.6. Other stakeholders. 
E. DETERMINE WHERE WE WANT TO BE 
3. The third task was described by Bryson as “where you want to be.”176 In the third 
planning task, the guiding coalition compares and contrasts the impact of current 
conditions (internal fire service) and potential destabilizing forces (external to fire 
service) related to sharing information with the homeland security community. 
This third task attempts to broadly define the level of need (if any) for information 
sharing between the homeland security community and fire service based on the 
internal conditions and external forces identified in tasks 1 and 2 above.  
 
176 Bryson, Strategic Planning, 6. 
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Successful comparison of tasks 1 and 2 should result in future requirements and 
challenges relating to fire service information sharing. The challenges would be 
addressed in the fourth task.  
 
3.1. Compare tasks 1 and 2 to establish their impact on potential information 
sharing. 
 
3.1.1. Consider using the fire service/homeland security information-
sharing tool. 
 
3.2. Assess near-term future requirements if information-sharing changes are 
likely. 
 
3.2.1. Describe specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-
certain information-sharing services that fire personnel and the homeland 
security community will collaborate on. 
 
3.3. Assess long-term future requirements if information sharing is likely. 
3.3.1. Describe specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-
certain information-sharing services that the fire personnel and the 
homeland security community will collaborate on. 
 
3.4. Determine an evaluation strategy. How will you know when you have 
arrived? What metrics should the guiding coalition use to determine success? 
 
3.4.1. The criteria identified for this thesis and located in the information-
sharing matrix may be a starting point for discussion. 
 
F. DETERMINE HOW TO GET THERE 
4. Described by Bryson as “how to get there,” the fourth task will direct the guiding 
coalition in determining specific information-sharing change requirements needed 
to create the preferred information-sharing future.177 At this point the guiding 
coalition will move away from the highest-level strategic planning and begin 
setting goals and objectives that identify the operational mile-markers on the road 
to creating the preferred information-sharing future.  
 
 





4.1. The guiding coalition should develop a final draft information-sharing 
statement (mission, vision, scope of work statement) for executive leadership, 
citizens, crowd, players, subjects, context setters, and other stakeholders to 
approve.  
 
4.1.1. Generate ideas for inspiration and emotional appeal of the 
information-sharing project. Don’t underestimate the value of this step. 
Creating buy-in for the vision can be as important as the vision itself. 
 
4.2. Magnitude of fire service/homeland security information sharing can be 
identified by using the following considerations. 
 
4.2.1. Pace. Will the future information-sharing environment be 
enterprise-wide or partial? 
 
4.2.1.1. Will the future information-sharing environment be phased 
in by function (fire marshal, department size, geographically), 
gradual, rapid, pilot projects? 
 
4.2.2. Depth. Determine the number of changes that can be introduced 
before the number itself creates resistance to increased information 
sharing between the fire service and homeland security information-
sharing community. 
  
4.2.2.1. Consider engineering controls, behavior modifications, 
training education. 
 
4.3. Select the best or highest probability methods to achieve the stated 
information-sharing vision. 
 
4.3.1. Technological methods of change. 
4.3.1.1. Use of centralized data collection systems or decentralized 
type information-sharing systems. 
 
4.3.1.1.1. Compare centralized HSIN, NFIRS with decentralized 
Wikipedia, EBay, Skype information-sharing systems. 
Something in between? 
 
4.3.2. Structural methods of change. 
4.3.2.1. Hierarchical, scalar, flat, asymmetric. 
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4.3.2.2. Formalization, and coordination of information-sharing 
methods. 
 
4.3.2.2.1. Degree to which centralized rules, processes, and guides 
are used, compared to open-source information-sharing 
systems or processes. 
 
4.3.3. Managerial methods of change. 
4.3.3.1. Compensation, promotions, benefits, status, power, 
influence. 
 
4.3.4. People-oriented methods of change. 
4.3.4.1. Education or training to increase collection, dissemination, 
and consumption of potential terrorist-related information. 
 
4.3.5. Assess and select the techniques to promote the specific, 
measurable, time-certain information-sharing goals. 
 
4.3.5.1. Facilitative. 
4.3.5.1.1. The players, subjects, and context setters in the fire service 
information-sharing power vs. interest grid (Figure 15) act as 
conduits, assisting the crowd to achieve the identified goals. 
 
4.3.5.1.2. Attitudinal. 
4.3.5.1.2.1. Influencing the crowd and the public’s attitudes and 
behaviors toward potential terrorist activities and the 
need for information sharing. 
 
4.3.5.1.3. Political. 
4.3.5.1.3.1. Artistic negotiating and aligning of the crowd, 
subjects, players, and context setters to the specific, 
measurable, and time-certain goals of the guiding 
coalition. 
 
4.3.5.1.3.2. Coercive techniques may be useful when competing 
for scarce resources. 
 







G. FIRE SERVICE INFORMATION-SHARING IMPLEMENTATION AND 
EVALUATION PHASES 
Implementation and evaluation tasks were not considered in the scope of this 
thesis but should be considered if applicability of the analysis and planning tasks are 




VIII. CONCLUSION  
This thesis presents an analysis of a number of information-sharing options 
relating to terrorism and all-hazard strategies, policies, and programs, in an attempt to 
identify if U.S. fire personnel should participate in terrorism-related information sharing 
and—if they should participate—consider the legal, political, and operational boundaries.  
The research produced three macro-level findings, four information-sharing 
matrices, two strategic applications, and nine smart practices. The findings, matrices, 
applications, and smart practices are a result of comparing and contrasting legal 
compliance, political acceptability, target capabilities list linkage, operational impact, and 
cost of the current U.S. fire service information-sharing environment, the New York City 
Fire Department’s Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy, the U.S. fire service 
Intelligence Enterprise draft concept plan and the UK’s Civil Contingencies Act of 2004.  
The first universal or macro-level finding indicates that U.S. firefighters have 
legal, moral, and ethical responsibilities to gather and share potential terrorist-related 
information that could assist the homeland security community in preventing and 
disrupting terrorist attacks. Second, these responsibilities must be conducted within the 
context of a two hundred fifty–year U.S. fire service enterprise founded on saving lives 
and property while maintaining exemplary trustworthiness, reliability, and credibility 
with the public. The third inclusive finding was that legal and operational issues may be 
addressed by firefighters using standardized terrorist indicators while operating as sensors 
of opportunity during emergency and non-emergency operations, but fire personnel must 
not be specifically asked or assigned to gather information on suspected terrorists or 
terrorist activities. 
The first strategic recommendation of this thesis is to modify the National 
Strategy for Information Sharing (NSIS) to include the fire service as an information-
sharing partner in some situations. The second strategic recommendation presents a 
strategic information-sharing plan to enhance the current homeland security community 





The nine suggested smart practices are located in the analysis-and-
recommendations chapter of this thesis and range from four common terrorist indicators 
that every firefighter should know to national U.S. guidance templates for formally 
requesting classified information. 
Possibly more important than all the findings, recommendations, plans, and smart 
practices identified in this thesis is the recognition of who firefighters are and what they 
can do to prevent or disrupt terrorism through information sharing. Since before the time 
of Fire Chief Benjamin Franklin, the fire service has been built on the legal, moral, and 
ethical commitment to protect U.S. citizens through prevention and response. The 
continued sporadic, unstructured information sharing of potential terrorist-related 
information is unacceptable. We are at war, and war calls for risks if we want to prevail. 
One of the risks of using fire personnel to collect information in plain sight is the 
tarnishing of our reputation or possible legal action. I propose that the risk is considerably 
less than dealing with the consequences of the attacks on the Murrah Building or the 
World Trade Center, or more horrendous acts of terrorism. We must continue to build on 
the U.S. fire service’s long and successful history of prevention.  
More than seven years ago the terrorist attacks of 9/11 became the catalyst for the 
U.S. expansion of information gathering and sharing with non-traditional partners such as 
the fire service. Now is the time for action. The significant value of fire personnel’s 
prevention of life and property loss from terrorism through the use of standardized 
terrorist indicators and formalized collaboration with the homeland security community 
should not be underestimated. The more than one million U.S. fire personnel serving in 
over thirty thousand fire departments may be a phenomenal resource for our homeland 
security partners, and our homeland security partners could be a valuable resource for 
firefighters. If the strategic and operational recommendations identified in this thesis are 
implemented by the nation’s fire personnel, the volume of suspicious-activity reporting 
should increase and with it the potential for preventing or disrupting future terrorism in 
the United States. Citizens will be safer and, in my opinion, will appreciate their 
firefighters stepping up, as they have historically done to prevent life and property loss in 
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our country. The terrorist beat us on at least two days, April 19, 1995, and September 11, 
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